Anne Frank betrayed

Less a mystery solved than a scam well played

A factcheck of claims, annotations, storylines and theories of the Cold Case Team in ‘The Betrayal of Anne Frank’ by Rosemary Sullivan, as published by HarperCollins, 2022

Natasha Gerson, August 4, 2022
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“Those who were in the camps are always looking for signs that something has changed... that the great Indifference has ended.
Sorry lad, I feel anger rising again.
But I cannot stand the twaddle of people that just don’t care.
Twaddle that only serves their pretence of being noble, and their egos.
There are two kinds of people. Good people and indifferent people”

-Hendrik Van Hoeve,
‘the greengrocer to the Annex’, helper, hiding provider, fighter, survivor.
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NB:

Quotes from the book or CCT coldcasediary in this report are marked in bold.
Introduction
Launched internationally in January 2022, a HarperCollins book, ‘The Betrayal of Anne Frank’ by Rosemary Sullivan is being sold worldwide. In it, a Dutch Jewish notary, Arnold Van den Bergh, is accused of betraying the Frank family and other Jews. This would have occurred by way of ‘lists of hiding addresses’ he is alleged to have had access to. It is assumed he had those lists through his position with the Jewish Council. Evidence offered to the existence of such lists is so vague it can be considered non-existent. But the cover blurb to the book states outright: ‘An international team has finally solved the mystery that has haunted generations since the end of the Second World War’.

Author Rosemary Sullivan wrote the book based on research provided by a Cold Case Team. The CCT was led by Dutch journalist Pieter Van Twisk, filmmaker Thijs Bayens and ex-FBI detective Vince Pankoke from the United States. For over five years, this CCT of some 20 researchers, backed by a substantial budget of undisclosed book advances, private donations, and a 100,000 Euro subsidy from the City of Amsterdam, investigated the 1944 raid and the presumed betrayal. The Dutch edition of the book was taken out of circulation by publisher AmboAnthos after two months. The retraction of the Dutch edition came right after a Refutation of the central theory of the book was presented on March 22, 2022 at the University of Amsterdam. The central theory -the accusation of Van den Bergh- was examined by a group of Dutch academics well versed in subjects pertaining to occupation and Holocaust. The Refutation can be downloaded here, and it’s helpful to read in advance of this report: Refutation_ENG_PDF.pdf (spui25.nl)

The German edition of the book is held pending, supposed to be postponed indefinitely after the German scholar who examined the manuscript declared the central theory as ‘unrepairable’.

But the English, French, Spanish and Polish editions continue to be sold, to readers who for the most part, remain oblivious of the many pitfalls and manipulations in the provided evidence: that it is, in fact, less a mystery solved than a scam well played.
Intentions
The book appears well-meaning from its intentional rhetoric. In the preface, initiator Thijs Bayens relays to Sullivan that his idea for a Cold Case Team stemmed from his perception of growing intolerance and division in his beloved Amsterdam, and he was looking for unification through the catharsis of clarity. According to Detective Vince Pankoke, ‘Solving the mystery of who was responsible for Anne Frank’s raid, would represent justice for all Holocaust victims, both young and old’², as, in their view, Anne symbolically represents all of them. The CCT directors had no previous experience with research on war, occupation and Holocaust.

The Cold Case Team anticipated a Jewish traitor to be a societal blow. And so, the conjuring up of a tribal Angst of Antisemitism became their central theory as well as their main rebuttal to criticism in the end. They expediently examined the possible effects of a Jewish suspect well before an actual Jewish suspect came up. Criticism on the research and conclusions were dismissed. In case international readers would happen upon the controversy in the Netherlands, the CCT and author declared that all the commentary had its roots in sensitivities within Dutch society, individual professional jealousy or their financial interests. Particularly the overseas members of the team, Rosemary Sullivan and Vincent Pankoke were vocal in this regard. For instance, in defence of their investigation, scholars -including those whose good name had been used to acquire funding without their knowledge³- were suddenly referred to as ‘so-called’ scholars⁴. Rosemary Sullivan also compared the mindset of the Dutch historians to that of Hitler⁵

The author and the CCT emphasise that it must have been the pressure and the circumstances, as well as fear for his own children, that led Van den Bergh to the betrayal. How understandable that was. That of course the real perpetrators were the Nazis. This assurance is not just repeated in the book, but again and again in the publicity, as if sympathising with the accused somehow diminishes the obligation to provide sound evidence to an accusation in the first place.
The “fresh view”
The presented basis for the CCT investigation was ‘starting over’, with a fresh view, bias-less, and scrutinising all available evidence again according to modern standards and state of the art technology and forensics.

To the Anne Frank Fund, Basel, ‘Vince explained that the purpose of a cold case investigation was to review previously unearthed information in the hope of finding new clues. In this case, earlier investigations had been done with too narrow a focus. New techniques and technologies could bring fresh insights. After that, the board members seemed somewhat less sceptical’ (page 26)

Further on in the book, the investigation gears up to ‘employ modern law enforcement techniques that had not been available to the investigators at the time the crime was committed, such as behavioral science (profiling), forensic testing, and artificial intelligence, defined as the computer system able to perform such tasks as visual perception, speech recognition, translation between languages, and decision making’ (page 102)

The reality of their investigation is a little less upstanding and a lot less thorough. Artificial Intelligence played no discernible part in the outcome as presented. Forensics were applied merely for effect and less congenial outcomes were eclipsed. Many possible leads to solving the background to the raid and connections between people and places were overlooked or ignored. Partial or corrupted digitalized documentation led to wrong conclusions. The application of other blessings of the digital age seems to have been in a manner that fragmented documentation into useless contextless snippets or were glossed over to present fanciful images of diligent perusing of yellowed files in dusty, far away filing cabinets. With most oversights or omissions in the book, the initial reaction was: How could this be? And, which of the two -oversight or omission-is the case this time? Eventually, a crafty pattern emerged.
Cherry-picking of previous writing. While the aim of the investigation was to start over again, completely from scratch, over two-thirds of the information of the book was cherry-picked from previously published material, such as biographies and popular historical reviews, and the (narrow) one third of ‘new’ research is mostly based on previously much-scrutinised archival material. Of course there is nothing wrong with using secondary sources, but not where starting afresh was the aim and much of that secondary material is presented as new finds, while previous mistakes remain perpetuated, unchecked. On page 100 Sullivan reveals that the team was handicapped by the fact that there are privacy laws and restrictions to the CABR-files, as documents on post-war Exceptional Justice are called. Permission to review files can take up to six weeks at the time. Because these documents had to be translated for Pankoke and Sullivan, the team sometimes made use of (often clearly partial) copies and notes shared with them by previous researchers, or of pre-existing transcripts which contained errors. Despite the fact that all archives -except the Anne Frank Fonds in Basel- had been very forthcoming to accommodate them, the applicable curators were not consulted with regard to other solutions, and their explanations of the material were rarely listened to. In the book as well as in the publicity around the presentation, the CCT emphasizes the enormous amount of documentation they processed electronically (in one instance Pieter Van Twisk speaks of ‘big data’, ‘kilometres’ of documents, ten haystacks’). But the CCT data set, by their own admission, is only 66 Gb. That fits on a flash drive. This meagre amount is much too limited to make effective use of algorithm technique and electronic matching has absolute pitfalls. Through their own subsidy application to the Council of Amsterdam, the CCT committed to relinquish their data to the Amsterdam City Archives. This promise has as yet remained unfulfilled, but on the 1st of July the team posted on their website that they will relinquish these data at the end of August.

This report, by the way, has made use of the documentation acquired through the proper means and reviewed in context in their original languages, being Dutch, German, and sometimes, in letters, statements and agenda notations, a mix of both: The 1930s refugee Germano-Dutch this reviewer happens to have been familiar with since earliest childhood.
Trophies
There are effectively only two new finds, trophies, the Cold Case Team can boast, and they do. One is a cache of some 900 what they call the Kopgeld Receipts (‘Jew-hunting premiums’) that Vince Pankoke supposedly found in the National Archives in Maryland, US, from allied looting of wartime ephemera. Most probably in the form of microfiche. Mentioned over and over, never annotated with an inventory number or any identifiable source other than the NARA, seen by few. The evaluation of their history is rather insensitive to Dutch readers, especially where it is combined with the assessment by the US investigator Pankoke and Rosemary Sullivan, of the ‘subpar’ quality of Dutch post-war justice. What is disregarded is that maybe these investigations might have been less subpar, if all kinds of supposedly imperatively incriminating documents like that had not been shipped elsewhere, and sitting in storage boxes on American air bases at the time of Exceptional Justice. We must assume this collection had no bearing on the Prinsengracht 263 case: By the team’s own admission, the receipts don’t go beyond October 1943 and if anything conclusive had been found in them, they would have used it. The connections made by the CCT appear artificial and contrived. Whatever other post-war justice may have been subpar: The two lengthy, dedicated investigations into the raid on the Annex were not.

The other find is Otto Frank’s typed copy of an anonymous note sent to him sometime between 1945 and 1958, found in the home souvenir box of the 1963 lead investigator in the raid. This note was already effectively discarded as evidence by the well-informed, thorough investigator, Arend Van Helden at the time. As this report will substantiate, the Cold Case Team manipulated the outcome in favour of one exploitable storyline of a multitude of vague possibilities of betrayal, and ignored or obscured a lot of evidence that countered it.

Poison
The accusation of Van den Bergh by the Cold Case Team, on the basis of a poison-pen note echoes the wartime and post-war accusations against Van den Bergh by this adversary, J. Anton Schepers. Aspects of these accusations have been adopted by the CCT whilst obscuring the source. That Schepers is the most likely author of the note, both linguistically as motive-wise, is dismissed by the CCT on an array of false grounds.
The central accusation of Arnold Van den Bergh was already disproven by the historians’ Refutation. The Refutation, however, dealt with the central accusation of Van den Bergh only: Van den Bergh’s role in the Goudstikker sale, Van den Bergh in the Jewish Council and during the occupation, and the probability of the existence of the lists. But Sullivan’s book implicates others too. On the whole it is an injustice to Holocaust victims and survivors as well as members of the resistance. Some named in the book, others included namelessly in the implication. Their remembrance, in particularly that of all those innocent civilians, men, women and children deported from Westerbork and Vught in the final mass transports, is defiled by it, their histories, their suffering, bravery, (bare) survival or death debased with groundless insinuation and deliberate distortion.

Jewish power
I originally started looking into the claims and sources of the book quite soon after publication, when I found the introduction to the ‘stakeholders’ in Anne Frank’s legacy to be suggestive with an unsavoury undertone. The first pages already proved rife with simplifications and outright impossibilities. When every initial, random probe check I executed on documentation that was readily available revealed gross digressions, I knew something was seriously amiss. I was not the only one. Criticism from historians, close readers, bloggers and/or members of the Dutch Jewish community proliferated on all sorts of details. Strangely, to no avail internationally. The US and British media, as, initially the Dutch, had been quick to embrace the ‘revelation’ of the Jewish betrayer, but were loath to retract their immediate acceptance. Some minor attention was given to the Refutation, as a ‘counter-opinion’. The clamoured anticipation of Jewish ‘emotional’ contention effectively silenced organisations in Europe and the US: Criticism could be cast off -dangerously- as non-acceptance, due to fear, pride, or interests, of a ‘painful truth’. Protest was therefore counterproductive. Perseverance into the matter could be insinuated at or explained negatively as powerplay with all classic connotations attached.

One of the central claims to the accusation of Van den Bergh, that in order to get a so-called ‘Calmeyer-status’ (to be declared non- or only part Jewish) one had to have (higher) Nazi contacts, or at least a lot of money, is pertinently and provenly untrue. The same goes for ridding oneself of penal status for hiding, in
1944. It insinuates possible betrayal of Holocaust victims by Holocaust victims, their final fate similar to Anne’s. Individual and mostly random examples are crudely used as fillers to paint a broader picture of rampant inter-Jewish betrayal. The suggestion is that the examples are merely the tip of an iceberg, and many other cases must have been sublimated later. Suggestions without one shred of evidence, often by way of unsubstantiated Nazi sources and through a lot of manipulation of remaining fact provided to the CCT, as will be unravelled in this report.

Because there is no betrayer without a betrayal, the impression is maintained throughout the book that the SD did nothing but arrest Jews that were betrayed by informers: V-men and -women, and that a disproportionate number of these betrayers were Jewish. A whole spectrum of departments and organisations, including research departments both residing under the umbrella of the Referat IVB4 and outside it, is condensed to a unit of bounty-hunters. In this simplification, they overlook the possibility of other causes and reasons for raids and arrest than betrayal of Jews in hiding, and the complexity of the totality of Occupation.

Above all the book purports, through distortion and provable source fraud, a rather classic premiss of Jewish conniving, at the exclusion of non-Jews. In this case in the form of the lurid tale of Otto Frank ostracizing his friend, business partner and helper Johannes Kleiman in favour of Ab Cauvern and other Jews, to cover up his own betrayal. This upon supposedly realising the betrayer was a Jew and ‘for fears of antisemitism’. Within this theory, a whole spectrum of others, from former investigators and Miep Gies, to current historians and the organisations involved with the legacy of Anne Frank, as well as Dutch authorities, would have aided and abetted Otto’s manipulations henceforth. All supposedly continuing this alleged historical suppression for ever-worsening reasons, such as Anne Frank’s commercial value.

However, the actual documentation shows the very opposite of the CCT claims.
1. **Luxury Hotels and Difficult Questions**

Basel, Amsterdam, Frankfurt.

In Chapter 4 of the book, headed ‘The Stakeholders’, the CCT team begin to explore the structure that surrounds the legacy of Anne Frank, largely unchanged from how Otto Frank installed it. There is the Anne Frank Fonds (AFF) in Basel that handles the copyright of the diaries, and the protection of Anne’s image from exploitation. From the royalties of the book, the AFF initiates and funds scientific research on Holocaust-related projects. A spin-off is the Frank Family Centre (FFC) which is part of the Jewish Museum in Frankfurt, that centres on Anne’s heritage in Germany, re-establishes the rightful place in German history the family had before the rise of Hitler. The FFC now houses the Frank family archive. Then there is the Anne Frank Stichting (AFS/ Anne Frank Knowledge Centre) attached to the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam. The AFS is of a less formal, more educational field of activity. Providing historical context to the story of the Annex, the inhabitants and helpers, but also monitoring and countering antisemitism and other forms of racism and extremism. The AFS finances itself from entrance fees to the house. There are legal issues between the organisations, whereby matters involving overlapping interests were settled in court multiple times. These issues however, do not much affect research as the different organisations have joint remote access and everything in possession of the Anne Frank Fonds and the Anne Frank Family Centre can be viewed at the Anne Frank House too: The CCT also had ample opportunity for this, of which they made use. Much is made of the rift in the book however (‘The degree of acrimony shocked the team’). In 2016 the CCT sought collaboration and funding with the Anne Frank Fonds in Basel.

“In the very first phase of the project, Thijs was drinking tea with a friend and explaining his thoughts about the cold case investigation. The friend told him that on one of his visits to the luxurious hotel La Colombe d’Or in the south of France, he’d run into one of the board members of the Anne Frank Fonds (AFF). (The hotel is well known for its art by Pablo Picasso, Henri Matisse, Marc Chagall and many other famous artists, who left their works on the walls as payment in kind for their stays.) Thijs’s friend said that when they were ready, he would set up a telephone call between Thijs and the board member” (page 25-26)

What is the function of the description of the hotel? Why should initial contact be made through a common acquaintance who once stayed there, as if it concerns some sort of secret society? It sets a disturbingly stereotypical tone, one of cahoots and collusion and possibly even profiteering that is maintained all through the book.
The list of artworks appears to be a construed preface to the later narrative on Van den Bergh as a notary in the sale of the Goudstikker art collection. The emphasis on the bad relations between the two foundations, the luxury hotel frequented by a board member and the cloak and dagger approach of the Fund set the tone for the description of a fatal meeting.

The CCT does not meet the requirements for funding by the AFF, but they are invited to pitch their project anyway. The meeting starts cordially enough, but quickly turns sour when they reveal the proposed project title ‘A Cold Case Diary: Anne Frank’. Yves Kugelmann, one of the board members, objects to the use of the name of Anne Frank in the project title.

Sullivan writes:

‘And then Kugelmann spoke the words Thijs, Vince and Pieter would not soon forget. He said that the team would never be able to solve the case without the help of the Anne Frank Fonds, insinuating that the Fonds possessed something that was key to solving the mystery. If it did have something, it would likely be in its archives, but it was unclear what specific evidence Kugelmann meant.’ (Page 27)

Insinuating that is a highly charged interpretation. Is board member Kugelmann really insinuating the board is wilfully withholding evidence known to them, that would solve ‘the mystery’ of the betrayal and arrest? If so, why would he tell the CCT?

Barbara Eldridge, Executive Secretary of the AFF and present at the meeting, says she is quite certain that Kugelmann made no such statement.

“We always knew that there is no hint – let alone evidence – or any other trace in our archives that would lead to the name of a betrayer. If there had been, we would certainly have come forward ages ago with any findings. The Anne Frank House too has had full access to Otto Frank’s and the family’s archives and has researched them thoroughly, also without any conclusions.”

All in all, the meeting was in her perception nothing like the volatile affair that is drawn in the book.

The board mainly balked at the commercial aspects of the undertaking and, rather prophetically, a board member enquired: ‘So, what happens if there is no outcome, if you don’t find anything?’. This question was actually asked by many others all through the investigation, and the reply was always ‘The integrity of the investigation will prevail’.

At the end of the meeting, director John Goldsmith asked Vincent Pankoke: “You know that Otto lied to Wiesenthal about knowing the identity of Silberbauer.
Why do you think he did this?” Pankoke replied that he didn’t know that but that he was determined to find out. Here Sullivan writes: “This was the first time the Cold Case Team understood that Otto Frank had held secrets”. Otto’s refusal to provide Wiesenthal with the name of the main arresting officer, Karl Silberbauer, is a well-known and much-pondered aspect of the case, featured in many articles and biographies. To date, there has been no definitive answer to this question. But it’s one of those questions where answers usually do say something about those that offer them. In this case that the CCT came to the pitch badly prepared and thus uninformed.

Rosemary Sullivan wrote the book on the basis of the CCT’s research and points of view. But wouldn’t it have been a reasonable effort by a conscientious writer if she would, when citing people, or third-guessing the intentions of those interviewed by the CCT, have checked whether nothing was lost in transcription, translation or communication? She never bothered to contact Kugelmann or Goldsmith to see if the presented picture and quotes were accurate. Another example is where she has Guido Abuys, the curator of the Westerbork archives ‘looking surprised’ at the barrack change of the Weiszes. Abuys didn’t know he was quoted in the book. Crucial statements by Joop Van Wijk, Bep Voskuijl’s son were distorted. The same applies to Van den Bergh’s granddaughter and several specialists. And to David Barnouw’s supposed confirmation of Otto’s visit to Gringhuis. And even the loss of the document from the NIOD that would prove it. If her arrangement with the CCT forbade her to check quotes and attributions, she shouldn’t have taken the job. But apparently, Sullivan was satisfied with everything she was handed, to cast the die and set the tone. All this from a lauded academic.

Sullivan’s conclusion on the meeting with the AFF: ‘And so the Cold Case Team learned lesson number one: the entities devoted to maintaining the legacy of Anne Frank were more mysterious and complex than even Jan’s labyrinthine graphic had suggested. And the team had no idea how much, much more complicated everything would become’ (page 28)

Entities is a rather charged word to use here. In another instance, Sullivan called the Refutation historians ‘a cabal’10.
2. The Note and the Timing of the Note.

The note in the Van Helden file.

The 1963-1964 investigation file\(^\text{11}\) of the case of the arrest of 8 Jews on the 4\(^{\text{th}}\) of August 1944, by detective Arend van Helden, mentions the anonymous note that is so central in this book. On page 18-19, detective van Helden writes, translated:

Also I hereby mention, that during this investigation Mr. Frank informed me of the fact, that shortly after the liberation of our country, he had once had received an anonymous writ, that pertained to the betrayal he was once subjected to. 
While retaining a copy of said writing, he had at the time handed it over to one of the board members of the “Anne Frank Stichting”, then recently established. Although I have made inquiries into the original specimen, I did not manage to succeed in bringing it to the surface. The contents were: (follows text of the note).

In his final report of the Annex case, written at the end of 1964, Detective van Helden first times the reception of the note by Otto Frank as ‘shortly after the liberation of our country’ - liberation in the northern part of the Netherlands, generally meaning early May 1945. Otto Frank would probably not have used this term -after all, his liberation was elsewhere and he had little reference to it. Few Auschwitz survivors speak of ‘the liberation’ as a time marker for May 1945. They usually say: ‘on return’ or simply ‘afterwards’. So, the wording of this time-indication is van Helden’s. The report conclusion was written a little under a year after the interview with Otto Frank, and remains the sole and only reference timing the reception of the note as shortly after the war.

At the time
What the CCT have omitted, is that this sentence about the liberation, is contradicted by the next passage in the actual report, where van Helden writes: ‘he had at the time handed it over to one of the board members of the “Anne Frank Stichting”\(^\text{, then recently established.} \) ‘At the time’ and ‘then recently established’ surely pertains to the time of reception of the note.

Van Helden could be forgiven for momentarily thinking that the Anne Frank Stichting was established in 1947 - when the diary was published- not ten years later, in 1957. Even if he hadn’t mixed the two up, it would still time the note as received after the diary came out.

It's highly probably that Otto timed the note as received around the time that the foundation was established. The remainder of Kleiman’s letter to Otto of the 31\(^{\text{st}}\) of March 1958, the very first written mention of the anonymous note, refers to matters regarding the new organization. There had been a renewed bout of
publicity: The Dutch version of the play was on tour. The Hollywood movie was being made and the studio was doing casting calls in Holland. Interestingly, several newspapers printed a photo of an audition in Amsterdam featuring some of the young candidates, pretty dark-haired girls. One of them was Lily Van den Bergh, the later TV presenter and anti-Zionist activist, very remotely related to Arnold. Was the author of the note triggered by the name Van den Bergh and Anne Frank in one mention?

There was a large funding call to save Prinsengracht 263 from being demolished. Half a million guilders were needed to acquire it and restore it to be opened to the public. This was also why notary van Hasselt was brought onto the board. The actual 1963 interview with Otto does not mention the note at all. Nor does any of the documentation of the 1948 investigation by brigadier Jacob Meeboer, from which the CCT draws the conclusion that he must have kept silent about it at that time. Van Helden disqualified the accusation in the note after investigating Van den Bergh. He also looked into the existence of the mentioned lists by asking Aus der Fünten, de facto head of the Zentralstelle about them. All ignored by the CCT. Van Helden wrote off the anonymous note as not credible, but kept the copy that Otto Frank had typed up, as a souvenir in his personal file at home.

Sullivan suggests that van Helden’s investigation was perfunctory and references to Van den Bergh’s integrity were enough for him. That is because the CCT chose to ignore that a logical step for van Helden, himself a P.O.D. and P.R.A. investigator after the war, would be to look up Van den Bergh in post-war justice files and find the whole Schepers affair. But most importantly, the CCT buried the very clear declarations by Zentralstelle heads Ferdinand Aus der Fünten and Willy Lages. Aus der Fünten stated:

“You also ask me if I as [follows explanation of his function regarding to Lages, NG] [at the] Zentralstelle fur Jüdische Auswanderung, seated on the Adama van Scheltemaplein in Amsterdam, ever made the acquaintance of de Jewish notary you mentioned, A. Van den Bergh, living in Amsterdam on the Oranje Nassaulaan. I don’t remember this man. Of course, I met several functionaries of the Amsterdam Jewish Council during wartime, but never the aforementioned Van den Bergh. It is also unknown to me that there was to have been a list provided by him at aforementioned “Zentralstelle” of names and addresses of Jews”.

Lages stated: ‘You ask me if I know one A. Van den Bergh, who used to be a notary in Amsterdam, and according to you a member of the Jewish Council. This name is not familiar to me’.

Both signed and dated, Breda, January 3rd, 1964.
For once we can safely believe Nazi statements in this regard, because at this crucial time the ‘Breda Four’ were feverishly seeking sentence reviewal again (Lages was released two years later) and the slightest evidence of shared culpability by Jewish leaders would, to them, have been defence gold. But apparently they weren’t taking the chance of lying about it. Possibly the author of the note, a few years before, had hoped some lower-rank incarcerated war criminal would confirm it though. Or perhaps the author imagined it all to be true. The Cold Case Team well understood, and Sullivan explicitly confirms this, that if the anonymous note was sent after Anne Frank and her diary became known, it would greatly diminish the validity.

‘If the letter had arrived ten years later – say in the mid-1950s- it could be argued that someone was just trying to use Otto’s fame to cast a negative light on Van den Bergh’ But:
‘at the time the note was received in 1945, the diary was not yet published and Otto Frank was just one of the 5,500 Jews returning to the Netherlands’ (page 276)

In other words, the timing of the note as having been delivered in 1945 was imperative for the CCT to make the case against Van den Bergh. And so they went to great lengths, in fact, right across the ethical divide way into fiction by any standards, to time the delivery of the note to 1945.

The Gringhuis visit
The CCT claims that Otto went to the Amsterdam HVBII prison on the 6th of December 1945, to question one of the policemen present at the raid, Gezinus Gringhuis, about the note and about Van den Bergh, and that this conclusively dates the note: After all, it had to have been received to enquire about. Gringhuis allegedly knew the notary and would have attested to Van den Bergh’s character with the words ‘no reason to doubt his integrity’ or something in the same vein. This is repeated in three different passages in the book.

“Otto then made a second visit to the prison to interview Gezinus Gringhuis. He made a notation to that effect in his agenda on December 6, 1945, along with the name Ab. That likely refers to Otto’s close friend Abraham “Ab” Cauvern [...] Otto was clearly hoping to have his case taken up quickly by the POD [Political Investigation Department] but in 1945 he was just one of 5,500 survivors returning from the camps.” (page 165-66)

Further on in the book: “Contrary to what he told Detective van Helden, Otto had indeed done some investigation into Van den Bergh. When he visited the
Dutch Policeman Gezinus Gringhuis in prison on December 6, 1945, he specifically asked him about Van den Bergh and the anonymous note. Gringhuis supposedly replied: ‘There was no reason to suspect the man’s integrity.’ It’s hardly likely that Otto accepted Gringhuis’ word as to Van den Bergh’s character. But it is clear that only a few months after receiving the anonymous note on his return from Auschwitz, Otto was taking it seriously. What is most interesting is that in his visit to the prison, Otto didn’t take either Kugler or Kleiman with him but rather (as his agenda indicated) ‘Ab’. Abraham ‘Ab’ Cauvern was a close friend...

The claim is repeated a third time as one of the former FBI-detective Pankoke’s frequent and this time final musings, where it serves to convince Pieter van Twisk during a dramatic re-rendering of supposed evidence in a long night of deliberation “Otto even returned with his friend Ab Cauvern to question Detective Gringhuis, and that time he pointedly asked about Van den Bergh (...) At the time it must have been a tough decision for Otto not to inform Kugler or Kleiman about the anonymous note, for they too, were victims of the betrayal and ended up in internment camps. Perhaps Otto thought that if he did tell them, they would immediately contact the collaboration authorities, which he was not prepared to do’.

And then there are several passages where it is repeated that in those dark times upon his return, after learning of the demise of his daughters, Otto Frank took the note seriously enough to investigate it: Vince Pankoke even opines both in the book and his ‘rebuttals’ to criticism, that investigating the note must have become some sort of crutch for him in his mourning process. There is no indication whatsoever from Otto’s agenda, correspondence or later interviews with his nearest, to believe this to be anything but downright projection by Pankoke. One assumes, on initial reading, that this prison visit to Gringhuis, in the company of Ab Cauvern, excluding Johannes Kleiman, and all these other details, must be well established. The first passage speaks of Otto noting ‘something to that effect in his agenda’, alongside the name Ab (no source, no annotation).

The Agenda
But the contrary is the case. Otto’s agenda displayed both the month as well as the year on the top of each page, so no mistake is possible. His entry leaves no room for interpretation. Otto jotted down, in pencil, in capitals, and , with an exclamation mark: POD!15 Apparently, he was finally meeting the Politieke
Opsporingsdienst, the police department set up to capture war criminals. Their office was on the top floor of the Hirsch-building on the Leidseplein. Far away from the jail at the Amstelveenseweg where Gringhuis, was incarcerated.

Kleiman, ‘Meesters’ and ‘Helene’ were crossed out for that day. But Distributie, the other notation, was too important. For ab -lowercase letters- is not Ab, a first name, but a sense of duty. A German proposition, used here as a discipline, meaning: ‘as from/onwards’ (the same as the Dutch *vanaf*). Otto’s agenda’s through several years show three different types of ‘ab’ notations. One is ab, lower case, meaning from as in *after*, one is Ab. with a dot which is *Abend*, and one Ab (in 1945 Ab+Isa) meaning Cauvern. *Unfortunately a circulating transcript by the Anne Frank-Stichting from 2007 has muddled up the variation of the notation for December 6, 1945, and possibly others, where ab became Ab!*  

Maybe the Cold Case Team never looked at a scan of the actual agenda but just had the transcription in their bookcase. Another example of the pitfalls of relying on secondary sources stripped from context. In any case, Otto’s friend, and fellow survivor, Ab Cauvern had nothing to do with this lower case ab on that 6th of December, and neither does the agenda entry make *any mention* of Gringhuis, prison, the note or anything else at all that could vouch for the prison visit claim.

David Barnouw and Gerrald van der Stroom, two historians from the NIOD *Institute of War, Holocaust and Genocide studies*, had already written that Otto Frank had spoken to the *POD* on December 6th 1945, in their 2003 overview of the ‘Anne Frank traitor theories’, and on the base of his agenda notation ‘POD!’. In a different context: namely that of another betrayal suspect. They had concluded this must have been the occasion where the POD had convinced Otto Frank in no uncertain terms as to the true nature of Tony Ahlers. Otto wrote to his mother about going to see the ‘Kommission’, and being informed about Ahlers, five days later. Barnouw and van der Stroom mention the note and the accusation in it, and even the alleged visit to Gringhuis in another chapter (and as ‘in December’) but annotate Carol Ann Lee and her book ‘the Hidden Life of Otto Frank’ as the source.

**Notation error**

So where did Carol Ann Lee find this tale of Otto visiting Gringhuis? Is it even plausible? Say Otto had the stamina as a survivor, to visit, in a jail setting, this detestable individual that had helped to deport his family, on the off-chance...
that this character would know anything about the note or Van den Bergh. Why wouldn’t he just have confronted notary Van den Bergh himself? Why, if he had wanted to bury the Van den Bergh issue out of a sense of Jewish unity and protection, would he have suddenly typed up a copy of the note and spread it around in the fifties, and then given the copy of the note to detective van Helden during the second investigation?

This alleged and improbable visit is actually nothing more than a mention of a supposed visit, undated. Once erroneously only said to have been made by Gringhuis himself, as mentioned, by biographer Lee. Nothing like it is in any of Gringhuis’ case files. If one views the aforementioned 1964 report by van Helden, though, it becomes clear where Lee’s mistake came from, and Barnouw and van der Stroom, and others since, could have noticed it. It’s a viewing and notation error. On page 18, in the passage translated at the top of this article, van Helden summarises his interviews with Grootendorst and Gringhuis, and ends that paragraph with a quote from Gringhuis, where Gringhuis denies having participated in the raid on the grounds that he would have remembered the arrest of eight Jews. This is also quoted by Lee on the same page of her book. Van Helden did not use quotation marks for the Gringhuis statement.

Helden then proceeds, with the word ‘Voorts’ (Also) to the matter of the note to write that Mr Frank related to him, him being van Helden, not Gringhuis, of having received an anonymous note etc. Further on, on page 19, tellingly, van Helden’s remark that there is no cause to doubt Van den Bergh’s integrity, which Lee ascribes to Gringhuis, and Barnouw quotes too. As there really is no other instance to be found in all of the documentation where Gringhuis and the note appear on the same page, let alone in consecutive sentences and with comparable wording, this is most probably the passage that was perceived by Carol Ann Lee -not a native Dutch reader- as belonging to the paraphrasing of Gringhuis’ statement. Because this is also the passage with the sentence ‘after the liberation’, strangely the passage that is used as a quote from Gringhuis by Lee, - the sentence on the integrity of Van den Bergh- is also the one the CCT does ascribe to van Helden himself! The only annotation Sullivan and the Cold Case team give for all three references to the prison visit and all the assumption they build on it, is nothing short of bizarre. The annotation to note 7, chapter 38:

“The source of this confrontation between Otto and Gringhuis is Carol Ann Lee. The Hidden Life of Otto Frank (New York, Harper Perennial, 2003) 219. Lee mentioned the conversation, as did David Barnouw and Gerrold van der Stroom in their investigation, ‘Who Betrayed Anne Frank?’. Though they were confident in the assertion and suggested that the conversation would be in the
Silberbauer Doc. 1 file, a thorough search could not locate the source of the information. However, all three attest to its authenticity. We assume that the file was lost, removed or misfiled.”

The Silberbauer Doc.1 file at the NIOD is, of course, where it has always been, and the contents too are the same as they ever were, including the passage described above, from the Van Helden investigation, its central document. The suggestion that the NIOD would ‘lose, remove or misfile’ any such document, is absurd. David Barnouw denies he accredited the annotation. And dismisses conclusions about missing files at the NIOD. He just mentioned both the note and the presumed visit, with reference to Lee, in his overview of other betrayers as a matter of integrality in his 2003 report and book. It must be said that he could have been clearer in his wording, for it reads as if he doubted Gringhuis’ supposed claim rather than the actual visit having taken place. And he could have spotted where it came from. But only a clairvoyant could have anticipated such a tale being spun from such a minor aside remark nineteen years later, including manipulations of agenda notations. Hopefully he’ll amend this reference in the upcoming overhaul of his book. Carol Ann Lee might well have said the source must be the Silberbauer. Doc.1 file, for that is basically correct. She just made a wrong interpretation of the documents, based on where a citation ended and the writer continued in his own voice.

Finally, if Otto had requested a guarded personal enquiry with Gringhuis over the betrayal or some note in attendance of the POD, and such had taken place in this form, there would have been a record in Gringhuis’ file, his lawyer would have been present and there would be correspondence about the terms. The suggestion that a camp survivor, of whom nothing was known at the time except that he had lost all of his family - could have a private, undocumented, unattended and thus unsecured visit with the policeman who arrested them, in his remand cell (mostly shared!) is very unlikely, especially under the circumstances of incarceration in 1945. If that were possible, many would have taken the opportunity to take crude justice into their own hands there and then. Let alone that the incarcerated could also seize the opportunity to harm or intimidate witnesses. It would have made the prisons even more of a bedlam than they already were at the time. See also David Barnouw’s assessment on the probability of another supposition of Lee’s, concerning alleged visits of Otto Frank to Tonny Ahlers in Scheveningen.
The Kleiman letter
The very first mention of this note, in all documentation ever, is in a letter from Johannes Kleiman to Otto Frank, no sooner than March 31st, 1958. The relevant passage in the letter, in dismal translation in the book (page 247) is:

“I have read the anonymous letter that was sent to me by notary van Hasselt. The latter knew notary van den Bergh, who lived nearby, but the latter has long since passed. He did not know any better than that the latter was “good” at that time. Dr. de Jong would inform the justice department, but both gentlemen found it better not to ascribe too much value to such anonymous notes. Question 1 arises immediately, why does such a person only now come forward with such an accusation? Dr. de Jong will report to me further when he finds out something”.

Kleiman’s pertinent and logical question ‘why only now’ is problematic to the timing of the note in 1945 by the CCT. ‘Only now’ infers that the note was only recently received, and not thirteen years earlier. The Cold Case Team and Sullivan conclude that this means Kleiman was, as they write ‘confused (or misled?)’ all these years, and had only then been told by van Hasselt of a note from a decade and a half ago, and this is put to use in the theory that Kleiman was ‘excluded’ from investigations into the note for years. Why he would then suddenly be included is left unaddressed.

This could only be pulled off though, by one of the many ‘errors’ that serve their storyline so well. For ‘I have read the anonymous letter that was sent to me by notary van Hasselt’ is an incorrect translation of the original, somewhat archaic Dutch. In the Dutch original, Kleiman writes:

“Het mij gezonden annonieme briefje heb ik notaris van Hasselt voorgelezen”

(spelling mistake of anonieme retained for authenticity). Correctly translated to English, it reads:

“The anonymous note sent to me, I read out to notary van Hasselt”.

“The anonymous note sent to me, I read out to notary van Hasselt. He did know a notary van den Bergh who lived in that area, but he is now long dead. He didn’t know any better than that he was ‘good’ in those days. Dr. de Jong will try to find information at the Justice department, but both gentlemen consider it better not to attach too much value to anonymous notes like that. Question 1 that arises immediately, why would such a person come up with an accusation like that only now? Dr. de Jong will let me know if he finds out anything”
So Kleiman knew full well when the note was received, because he picked it up from the Prinsengracht 263 doormat himself. There is no reason to think it was the copy of the note, sent to him by Otto, that he read to van Hasselt, for then the wording in Dutch would have been different (“Het briefje dat je me zond”). Now, a strange thing occurs when you enter the first sentence of the passage of the letter, in Dutch into Google Translate: You get a wrong translation, and it’s exactly the one in the book.

Which Dutch member of the Cold Case team read the letter first? For a Dutch reader, it’s impossible to misinterpret the wording: ‘voorgelezen’. Tellingly, it’s the only document translation in the book that is not credited to Thijs Bayens’ son Joachim in the annotation, but says ‘translation Cold Case Team’, which apparently means the electronically translated sentence someone served up to Pankoke and Sullivan. The translators of the retracted Dutch edition never looked at any original Dutch texts. They translated all mis-translation to English right back to Dutch. If they had checked the wording of the original source here - an email to the Anne Frank House would have sufficed- questions could have been raised about the validity of the claims before publication. The letter portion they translated back to Dutch is nothing like the original.

On page 280, in the chapter ‘A secret well kept’ the Cold Case team and Sullivan ponder what the reason might have been for Otto not to take the note to the Jewish Honour Court after the war. All sorts of reasons are spun ‘as no similar notes surfaced, he might have been insecure how to proceed’ and such speculation but the possibility that he didn’t because he wouldn’t receive it for another decade is not considered.

Typesets and – face, wear and tear.

Then there is the extensive and no doubt well-executed typeset investigation by Bernhard Haas, presented with much hoo-ha in the Chapter ‘Experts at work’ (37). The typeface of the note copy is compared to the letters Otto wrote to Cara Wilson Granat; they have those sent over with special envoy from the US. These -later- letters are the only way, the CCT maintains, to establish that Otto Frank typed the copy, although no-one would have contested that in the first place because that was already established by van Helden’s notations on that copy and van Helden’s mention of the copy in his report. Finally, the copy was found in van Helden’s effects.

Haas of course obviously and correctly concluded that the typeset is a variation of RaRo with some wear and tear, and a few years earlier than the Wilson Granat
letters. What else he wrote in his report is unknown. For reasons only known to themselves, the CCT omit that this is congruent for a 1939 Erika 5-tab typewriter as Haas would probably have told them. Which is the typewriter Otto Frank used for the larger part of his post-war life. The copy of the note, judging by the typeface the CCT was set themselves on investigating, as pertinent, shows it to be not from 1945, but from the middle to late fifties.

The CCT could have simply compared the type-face on the copy of the note to a letter Otto typed on the same machine in 1945, the year they claim the note was received. After all, they must have had the letter they annotate in chapter 20, note 4. That is the letter, dated August 21st 1945, in which Otto files a complaint against Jacobus M. Jansen with the POD. If you compare the two, which need not be a microscopic investigation but simply sliding similar words (Amsterdam and Amstelveen, indertijd and inderdaad, etc) on top of each other on a light-case, you quickly see it’s the same typewriter. The spacing is the same, the J, for instance has a slight burr that fills up with ink. But the typeface in August 1945 was \textit{ramrod straight, the letters sharp and clear}, while they are already out of line in the copy of the note: The capital U is sunk, the undercast letter d jumps and the letters are flattening as Haas himself describes happens with use over time. So the CCT could not pretend the copy of the note was typed at the time of the perceived ‘reception’ van Helden writes of.

Haas would never have affirmed that.


On the Haas investigation:

\quote
That would confirm Otto’s statement to Detective van Helden that he’d made a copy of the note prior to providing the original to a board member of the recently formed Anne Frank House in May 1957\quote

And in the chapter ‘A note between friends’:

\quote
Otto and van Hasselt must certainly have discussed the contents of the anonymous note, but they seemed unsure as to what to do with it. Otto clearly felt the note was important enough to copy it and give the original to his friend, presumably for safekeeping\quote

Annotation to that is that very central page 18 of the Rijksrechercherapport, as translated above. But the report itself says that he made the copy of the note upon reception ‘at the time’. That means that there is no evidence that the note was received in 1945 at all, but ample evidence that it was received in 1957, or at least around the time of the establishment of the Anne Frank Stichting.
From Vincent Pankoke’s rebuttal of February 22\textsuperscript{nd} as well as the CCT’s exclusive press kit: “We would have expected Otto to have turned over the note to Kleiman, who was also a victim, having been arrested during the raid. However, Van Hasselt was intimately familiar with Arnold Van den Bergh and he was also Jewish, Kleiman was not.” (rebuttal)

“One can only imagine the backlash that would have ensued if Otto revealed that a fellow Jew was the betrayer, and this betrayer was a close colleague of his friend and fellow AFS board member. And this board member actually vouched for the integrity of the betrayer being fully aware of his collaboration with the Nazis. Otto, knowing the eternal heartache he himself suffered due to the loss of his children, would not want unfair scrutiny placed upon van Hasselt. Otto simply had to suppress his knowledge of Van den Bergh to protect his friend van Hasselt along with the image of the AFS/AFH.”

Did Vince Pankoke know the translation of the first sentence of Kleiman’s letter was manipulated and Kleiman was the receiver of the note? In his pompous last rebuttal (March 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2022) on the coldcasesidiary site\textsuperscript{24} he maintains: ‘\textit{Also in the letter, Kleiman states that Otto’s notary and fellow AFH/AFS board member, Van Hasselt, gave him the note. This supports our point that Otto never informed Kleiman of the note’s existence, but Van Hasselt is the one that told Kleiman. This proves that Kleiman was unaware of when Otto received the note and was kept in the dark by Otto’.

It appears the only one who was kept in the dark, was Vincent Pankoke, by the Dutch Cold Case Team leaders and there must have come a point of no return when he didn’t want to be informed otherwise anymore either. This rebuttal was written more than a month after my article in De Groene Amsterdammer\textsuperscript{25} had already pointed out that there was no notation of Otto’s prison visit in his diary, and the only reference ever to such an event came from Lee. Pankoke did not address these findings in his rebuttal. When informed by me of the erroneous translation of the letter, through Messenger, with the question whether he knew, or ever doubted the translation of the Kleiman letter given to him, and whether he realised Kleiman had received the letter, Pankoke’s reaction after reading it was to \textit{block me} \textsuperscript{26}. 
3. The Moesbergen Statement

In Chapter 25 the first mention of declaration by Jew-hunter Eddy Moesbergen with the claim that Moesbergen stated that he had tried to warn van den Bergh of a possible arrest after the loss of his Calmeyer status, presented as an example of van den Bergh’s ‘Nazi contacts’. That is a false rendition of Moesbergen’s declaration: This is Moesbergen’s (translated) declaration, part of a summing up where Moesbergen claims he was lenient on Jews:

‘Because I kept a message from Calmeyer - whose work it was to establish whether someone was of Jewish blood or not- with the contents of a negative decision concerning the ancestry of notary van den Bergh, then living Oranje Nassaulaan here, to myself for several days, it was my doing that this notary was not arrested right away. In those instances, the council of the involved would also be notified a day later, this must have been the case here also, because when I went there after two days asking Mr van den Bergh for a word, I was told that he had just left. So we can take it for granted that this notary had a chance to go into hiding thanks to me’

Not a word alludes to ‘warning’ or anything remotely like it, just part of a list of straws Moesbergen is grasping at, where he is trying to turn his greed combined with tardiness (we can safely assume that he ‘kept the message to himself’, not as a patriotic service, but in order not to have to share the premium, as was his way) as virtue, of humanity. As if the ‘word’ he wanted wasn’t arrest! Remember that Moesbergen was facing the death penalty when he gave this statement. Instances like this were all he could come up with. This is the only statement in which Moesbergen mentions van den Bergh. There is no indication that he knew van den Bergh. He might even just have known of van den Bergh as it is unlikely that the message (or tip) came from Calmeyer’s office directly as Moesbergen claims. One might wonder if any of Moesbergen’s statement is true at all. It’s even quite possible that Moesbergen only remembered van den Bergh’s name as a result of the vicious campaigning by van den Bergh’s adversary Schepers. He might even have heard the story during his incarceration. Whatever the case: Moesbergen never said he went to warn van den Bergh.

In Chapter 36, The Dutch Notary, the false claim of Moesbergen having stated he wanted to warn van den Bergh is repeated. The Cold Case team cites a witness – a betrayer! - claiming that Moesbergen had lists of hiding addresses. But there
is no indication where these lists were supposed to have come from, nor that they were supplied by any person instead of Sicherheitsdienst research. By then repeating the distortion of Moesbergen’s statement about warning van den Bergh right after, Sullivan slyly insinuates that these lists were the alleged lists from the Jewish Council and had something to do with Moesbergen being in contact with van den Bergh.

Again, there is no indication in the documentation that van den Bergh knew Moesbergen or vice versa at all. Although he didn’t say he went to warn van den Bergh, he tried to paint a lenient, benevolent picture of himself. From Roxane van Iperen’s book on the history of her house, (‘t Hooge Nest), translated as The Sisters of Auschwitz, we know differently. Roxane van Iperen’s minutely researched book, which fully deserved global success, might have added value to the CCT to there being a declaration by the famous villain Moesbergen about van den Bergh. They just could not help themselves and had to spice it up.

Sullivan writes on page 236:
‘Van den Bergh’s case was exceptional. On the one hand, he was able to ask the resistance to hide his children; on the other, he had enough powerful contacts in the Nazi hierarchy to secure Calmeyer-status and then to be warned in time when that status was withdrawn. This, to the team, was suspicious.’

It would indeed have been extremely suspicious if this had been remotely true but it isn’t. Except that he was indeed able to ask the resistance to hide his children, which makes him a lot less suspicious.
**4. The Nemesis**

J.W. Anton Schepers, notary Van den Bergh’s nemesis, first appears in the book on page 231, in the chapter ‘The Dutch Notary’. It’s not entirely clear if Sullivan refers to van den Bergh as the Dutch Notary, or to J.W.A. Schepers. Of course, both notaries were Dutch.

Sullivan describes Schepers fairly neutrally. He was a notary, she writes (although until taking van den Bergh’s protocol he had been a candidate since 1920, and was at that moment, a jobless tax revenue official) a Nazi sympathiser and NSB member. She writes that Pieter van Twisk found a fascinating CABR file on Schepers at the National Archive. From Schepers NA-file, van Twisk learns that Schepers was sentenced for collaboration. What is omitted is that this collaboration consisted *solely* of the war crime of denunciation of notary Van den Bergh, and this transgression -endangerment in the face of the enemy- was deemed so grave and prolonged that he was sentenced to four years in prison. Which in comparison to other cases is a very harsh sentence.

Schepers himself denied any ideology vehemently, although his membership of the NSB would finally surface in 1947. Among the articles apprehended during the body search after his arrest, was a gold swastika. He would never change his point of view that whatever the government, he adhered to the law of the time, so could not be judged for that later. His stubbornness in this regard is what kept him in prison for almost the entire length of his sentence: Arrested in June 1945, he was finally granted release in September 1948.

Sullivan does describe Schepers as very intent in taking over Van den Bergh’s notary business. She doesn’t dwell on -or possibly doesn’t understand- how strange that already was, in 1943, with the majority of Van den Bergh’s clientele deported or in exile. She describes Schepers’ reaction to Van den Bergh’s Calmeyer status -the administrative reversal to ‘non-Jewish’- as ‘apoplectic’. But on the whole Sullivan describes Schepers as nasty but sane. This was not the reality in actual fact. For Schepers was deranged.

The only way to relay the Nemesis Schepers, and to convey what the Cold Case Team have omitted and deliberately abused in this respect, how they have used the Schepers business to build their theory is to tell the story of Schepers as it presents itself from the documentation in the National Archives. From his probation files including psychiatric evaluation, his life story as told by his wife. But especially, in addition to that, from a thin but highly toxic post-war folder at
the NIOD\textsuperscript{30}. One that the book never annotates or quotes directly, but that they must have seen, because it is the sole source of several of the CCT’s central claims against Van den Bergh, such as

“\textit{He was paid handsomely, but even more important than the money was the fact that his role at Goudstikker N.V. and his association with Miedl provided him with many contacts within the SS and the Nazi administration who could ensure his safety.}” (page 236)

Life of Anton
Jan Willem Anton Schepers was born in 1896, after a prolonged and difficult delivery, in an unhappy, underachieving middle class family. He did well at school and graduated from the HBS, higher secondary education. There was no money for much tertiary education. He took legal courses and in 1920 graduated as a notary candidate. He then went to work for the tax office in Goor, where he became a zealous, relentless pursuer of tax avoiders. At first this brought him some success, but soon led to complaints. He was transferred to the North-western town of Hoorn. There he claimed ‘gossip from Goor’ made his employment difficult. His posting in Hoorn ended in a nervous breakdown, for which he was seen by the renowned neuro-psychiatrist Dr. Gabe Hoeneveld. Hoeneveld diagnosed him as suffering from chronic schizoid paranoia, with a possible psychopathic tendency causing his delusions of grandeur\textsuperscript{31}. Schepers recuperated from his breakdown, and went to Amsterdam to work for the tax office that dealt with the import of skins and hides. But he hated his new work, which was a demotion, promptly got fired again, this time without pension because of undisclosed administrative ‘mishaps’. He did not tell his wife for some time that he had lost his job. He had some savings; his wife came into a little money when her parents sold their shop. Though he had never progressed beyond candidate notary status, he did proceed to start a notary school. Doing so he squandered what money he had left as he did not have any pupils. Then war broke out. All this is left out of the book.

Schepers was a very specific type of antisemite: Obsessed with Jews that could be divided into Good Jews and Bad Jews. Jews were involved in everything, everything had to do with Jews and so he, as both an ambitious man of the world as well as the last righteous man in the universe, just had to involve himself with Jews too. In other words, he was afflicted with the classic obsessive antisemitism of the mentally unhinged. He associated Jews with classless freedom, affluence and influence, even at the height of their persecution.
Arnold Van den Bergh must have clearly been everything that Anton Schepers wanted to be, and actually strongly believed he deserved to be, *instead of* Van den Bergh: A successful notary, living in a pleasant house full of art on the Oranje Nassaulaan, right there by the Vondelpark. While, during the Occupation, being Van den Bergh in actual self was becoming less and less desirable, the chance presented itself for Schepers to replace Van den Bergh. The opportunity for Schepers to secure his long-stretched candidacy into a practice of his own, and no two-bit practice either. It was his one chance at redemption from social shame as he perceived it. And it would be for the good of everybody, he told himself. It would *help* Van den Bergh to have such a stable and dedicated substitute.

Schepers heard Van den Bergh had acquired Calmeyer status as a non-Jew soon after Schepers was promised Van den Bergh’s practice. He felt humiliated, defrauded. Not knowing anything about the workings of the Calmeyer office - no-one did or it wouldn’t have worked- he must have immediately assumed Van den Bergh had Nazi friends in high places, who had fixed things for him at a large fee, an assumption the Cold Case Team was to adopt eighty years later. It was all done to keep him, Schepers, at bay, and in humiliating financial conditions. Upon his arrest, soon after the liberation, Schepers declared: “*Everything told me that Kallmeyer [sic] had to have been paid vast amounts of money by Van den Bergh*”

Not mentally incompetent, but near-delusional. Van den Bergh’s Calmeyer action had confirmed all Scheper’s existing ideas. So, he took his genealogical finds, and his pre-war press cuttings which featured Van den Bergh’s involvement with the Jewish community and Jewish charities to the authorities, including the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and even wrote a letter to Seyss-Inquart, the Reichskommissar of the Netherlands himself. He pleaded Seyss-Inquart for van den Bergh’s deportation. As he admitted after the war, he wrote to the SD and the Zentralstelle. The latter he consistently called ‘*the Jüdische Auswanderung*’ or J.A., just like the author of the anonymous note sent to Otto Frank, which Bart van der Boom in the Refutation already remarked on as not a sign of insider-hood, but as an ‘*ahistorical designation*’. He wrote to the LiRo, the bank that was annexed by the Nazis to rob Jews. He had to do this, according to his trial statement, because he knew/ sensed Van den Bergh to be a frequent visitor to the SD himself. It would only have been a matter of time, he claimed to the tribunal, before he would have been arrested, for underground activities no less, through *betrayal by Van den Bergh*. So, the letters had been pre-emptive, a necessary defence.
The judge would have none of it. Dr. Tammenoms Bakker, the renowned court psychiatrist, had noted in the conclusion of his evaluation that although Schepers was not mentally incompetent in the sense of not being responsible for his actions - he was fit to be held accountable for them: he did display several symptoms of what he called ‘convergent thinking’—almost-delusions in which everything is connected. This was part of his diagnosis which included euphoric overestimation of self, clear lack of sound judgement and querulous behaviour. The symptoms are memory adaptations, hiatus-filling fabulation, and projective action reversal. Schepers, in short, was prone to accuse people, defensively, of things he did himself.

Said W.H. Woortman, a high-ranking administrator [Dutch: procuratiehouder] to the Liro bank who, egged on by Schepers, wrote a vitriolic letter about Van den Bergh to the Calmeyer office that led to Van den Bergh’s assets being frozen: “Schepers called us several times and was known as a quite tiresome person. If I referred him to the Beauftragte, that would have simply been to be rid of him.”

Gerrit Oude Wolbers, the SD desk sergeant, testified about Van den Bergh’s employee Massee bringing proof to the SD of Van den Bergh’s Calmeyer status following Schepers complaints. He had never seen Van den Bergh at all.

Interestingly one of Tammenoms Bakker’s better known post-war writings is one of rather ground-breaking views at the time on the phenomenon of *pseudologica fantastica*, which he wrote less than a year after he last saw Schepers, in 1950.

Pyrrhic
By the end of 1943, Schepers wife had wanted to leave him, she told the psychiatrist. In 1947 she still wanted a divorce, but apparently from the documentation she never saw it through: they remained married until Schepers’ death in 1978. She had left, for six weeks. She endured the period where he was acquiring Van den Bergh’s business as a nightmare of manic lunacy. He had pleaded her to come back after he calmed down in February. Their daughter had remained at the hospital where she worked in the linen room.

Schepers finally got his Pyrrhic victory regarding Van den Bergh’s business: On the 25th of February 1944 the office deeds of Van den Bergh’s notary business were signed over to him. He publicized this with a string of adverts in what was left of the controlled Jewish press, aiming at clients who were by now mostly hacking out stone in Eastern quarries, dead or overseas. At the time, the advertising of notary businesses was considered improper by The Supervisory Board of the Chamber of Notaries. That was his first official warning. A host of
warnings were to ensue from then on. Van den Bergh’s employees Massee and Bruijning filed a complaint because Schepers didn’t pay rent. Schepers had Massee deported in the Arbeitseinsatz. A bank complained to the Chambers that Schepers refused to produce papers on a mortgage (possibly because he couldn’t find them), his bookkeeping was so minimal it could be considered absent. Of course Schepers contested the Chamber’s admonishments, but did not turn up for hearings. Finally the Chamber wrote that ‘it is with incredulity that she must observe that your lack of insight into what is proper to your guild, surpasses all standards of reason and admissibility” Schepers, having no business, took sheaves of files home with him and read his way through the Goudstikker papers. Some were even found, by Van den Bergh, in his bedroom after his arrest. Schepers earned just 900 guilders in the period of march 1944 to June 1945, so he could not even be charged with profiteering. At his arrest on the 2nd of June 1945, he was carted off from his house with severe oedema from malnourishment.

Internment
Schepers was sentenced to four years in prison. If only Schepers had shown real or even sufficiently faked progressive insight into what made his actions collaboration. If only he had apologised to Van den Bergh, things would probably have turned out very differently. In that case the weight of the complaint by Van den Bergh against Schepers would have probably led to a year, maybe two, if that. He could have been a free man after his tribunal finally came up in 1947. But Schepers being the way he was, refused to see sense. He sacked his lawyer and first decided to represent himself, but then thought the better of it and demanded another: ‘One that is not Mr. Talma and not a Jew’.

‘It would be so helpful’ wrote his new lawyer de Kort in exasperation ‘if he could see that his actions had been inopportune and wrong (...) but Schepers sees this differently and in his way of thinking, he perceives conspiracies against him, in which he suspects the hand of the notary van den Bergh. This man, unyielding in his strong convictions, writes endless letters about new constructions he perceives of workings against him, is now deteriorating fast both physically and mentally’. And: ‘This disastrous vicious circle in which this man of extraordinary thinking spins around.’

And so Schepers remained in prison. Scribbling away fervently at letters, resolved to clear his name from Van den Bergh’s defamation. And this is what the NIOD folder is full of. Letters by Schepers about Van den Bergh’s
machinations in the Goudstikker affair. Ramblings about Van den Bergh and Miedl, which we recognise to be the base of a whole list of Cold Case reflections on where Van der Bergh could have gone after his disappearance early 1944, about Van den Bergh and Goebbels’ sister. To the Minister of Justice. To the PRA. To the Queen. To radio newsreaders.

200,000 commission
The historians of the Refutation had been looking for the source of the 200,000 guilders commission (10%) commission that Van den Bergh supposedly received for the Goudstikker sale. It wasn’t in the report by von Saher, the later chronicler of the Goudstikker affair, although the CCT and Sullivan tried to pass it off as coming from there. The alleged 200,000, upgraded with a supposed 50,000 ‘hand money’ for notary van den Bergh does appear in the post-war file of Goudstikker-employee J. Dik jr., where PRA-agent A.M.G. Rouwhorst mentioned this commission was paid. The Cold Case team doesn’t annotate this, possibly because the statement comes too close to the source. In Rouwhorst’s report ‘Acts of Miedl, 1940’, the 200,000 is supplemented with his actual fees and ‘handmoney’. (translation:)

“Miedl bought the Goudstikker firm from the representatives of the Goudstikker heirs, through the notary office of Van den Bergh for 2,5 million guilders. The notary was furnished with the immense sum of 2,5 ton for his cooperation’

What was Rouwhorst source? Here’s the clue:

“Because Van den Bergh was not Aryan, the minutes that relate to this sale were passed over to notary Anton Schepers, Valeriusstraat, who will have returned them to Van den Bergh upon reinstatement”.

Rouwhorst seems to have thought at the time that Anton Schepers was a friendly temporary stand-in for Van den Bergh, rather like Massee and that his assessment of the minutes was correct. But in Schepers NIOD file, there, suddenly it is. The original source is Schepers, and only Schepers. Schepers didn’t just make the claim in his parole request, but in letters to all kinds of organisations and authorities. From the Goudstikker minutes, with his addled mind, he had mistaken the same amount that remained as ‘working capital’ in the Goudstikker business after its liquidation for money paid to Van den Bergh. And had proceeded to spread this rumour around so much the original source was lost from view.
Finally, Schepers even made his brother write a letter in his name to a Dutch envoy at the British War office declaring that he could provide evidence, through an unnamed ‘witness X’, that Van den Bergh was personally responsible for prolonging the war after 1942. The Cold Case Team must have found that last one a little too steep even for this book. Documentation at the NBI, the post-war claims and counterclaims institute, shows evidence of Schepers still seeking rehabilitation and repair in 1957, by then without representation.

Reasonings

Back to the Cold Case Team. First they deliberately ignore that the language of Schepers is unmistakably akin to that of the anonymous note. Subsequently they omit to annotate the NIOD file that indicates this and then give several reasonings why Schepers is, in their opinion, not the author of the note.

In Chapter 39, The Typist:
“Now the Cold Case Team turned their attention to the question of who sent the anonymous note. The most obvious suspect was J.W.A. Schepers, the pro-Nazi notary who took over Van den Bergh’s office. He loathed Van den Bergh, and certainly was engaged in a vendetta against him. Even after the war, it’s unlikely that his anger would have cooled. So why not take the next step and slander the man by accusing him of betraying a fellow Jew?” (page 250)

Note the suggestion that it is unknown to them whether Schepers still held a grudge against Van den Bergh. While all of the documentation in Schepers post-war file at the NIOD is Schepers rants over Van den Bergh’s “Jew tricks”.

Sullivan: “But Schepers would not have had the opportunity to deliver the note, since he’d been sent to prison as a collaborator on June 2, 1945, one day before Otto returned from Auschwitz. Prisoners were permitted to send letters but only handwritten on prison letterhead. If the original note had been on prison letterhead, Otto would surely have mentioned it to Detective van Helden or Kleiman would have commented on it in his letter to Otto – assuming, of course, that Schepers even knew who Otto Frank was, which was not necessarily the case” (page 250)

All this reasoning, except for the prison letterhead, is applicable only if the note was sent in 1945, as the Cold Case Team maintains on false grounds (‘not long after the liberation’, the presumption of Otto’s visit to Gringhuis which never took place, the changed sentence in the Kleiman letter). The prison letterhead suggestion doesn’t wash either. The letterhead they refer to gives visiting hours
and laundry regulations of the prison, to save prisoners writing that over and over or getting it wrong, and was simply the paper that was supplied when the prisoner asked for writing paper. Some variants even had a puncture line to tear the letterhead off if the prisoner so wanted. However, due to post-war paper shortages this kind of stationary was actually unavailable in 1945 and 1946. All prisoners, and indeed Schepers – as the CCT knows full well if they saw just one CABR file, let alone, by their claim, hundreds or even thousands - wrote from prison on all sorts of paper: thick pulp, course grey lined paper, the back of indictments, packaging paper, even used tray liners. The first example of the letterhead’s post-war reappearance in CABR- files is in the spring of 1947. Not that this is in any way relevant. Because the anonymous note was not sent from prison at all: Van Helden had jotted down on the copy that the original was also typed: ‘Was ook getikt’, in Dutch. If the anonymous note was sent after 1948, and it was, then Schepers is simply the most plausible author.

The Cold Case team infer they consulted forensic linguist Fleur Van der Houwen (page 251) to provide a profile of the author of the note, but the consultation was no more than a preliminary conversation. She accurately remarked the author might have been someone in government administration, bureaucracy, which fits with Schepers’ rocky but lengthy career as a revenue inspector. However, then the Cold Case team tell her there is no budget for an actual profile, and simply decide to add some qualifications of their own to the remark, such as that he must have been privy to inside information and therefore must have been active for the SD or similar. The Dutch CCT members have ignored that the note is in the modern spelling of after 1947 which the educated, certainly bureaucrats did not use before that year. They also ignore that the note does superfluously mention that A. Van den Bergh’s address is ‘by the Vondelpark’ but, tellingly, he isn’t referred to as ‘notary A. Van den Bergh’. Did the author refuse to acknowledge Van den Bergh’s post-war and pre-death reinstatement to his profession? The final reason for the CCT to disperse of Schepers again shows a total lack of understanding, similar to when Vince Pankoke stated that post-war investigation had been subpar because of all the collaborators lost to the force:

“Besides, as the team learned from his letters about Van den Bergh, before the war, Schepers had no scruples signing his name to nasty accusations and sending them to the appropriate authorities”. (page 250)

Actually, Schepers wrote his nastiest letters not before the war, but during the war, and they were about Van den Bergh. These landed him in prison afterwards.
His nasty letters about Van den Bergh after the war hampered his release until 1948. The status difference between being a candidate notary under an accommodating regime and being a redundant collaborator with a prison record and thick psychiatric file might have eluded the Cold Case team, but by the fifties, even Schepers must have caught on.

The author of the note didn’t want to be associated personally with the accusation of Van den Bergh as the traitor of the Franks. He must have hoped that Van den Bergh would be investigated, and that some war criminal were, by chance, to confirm that Van den Bergh, as a member of the Jewish Council, had betrayed his own people. If that were to happen, that would mean that one J. W. Anton Schepers might finally be vindicated. In fact, Schepers remains the sole person to have a real motive for an anonymous accusation of the deceased notary. It didn’t work at the time. Yet even then some of his accusations against van den Bergh bled into the common assumption. Bizarrely, the toxic seeds of Schepers’ sour grapes have germinated into saplings in 2022, fertilised and watered by the Cold Case Team.

But didn’t Miep Gies give indication of believing the traitor was Van den Bergh too? Let’s see.
5. What Miep said.

Vince Pankoke was lounging at home, listening to Miep Gies’ speech at the Wallenberg Award ceremony at the University of Michigan in 1994. It all bored him, but then, during the Q&A:

‘...at the conclusion of the speech, Wolfswinkel [Dutch professor of Modern History in New York, friend and accompaniment on her American tour of Miep, NG] invited questions from the audience, and a young man posed the question: “What gave the Franks away?” In the course of answering, Miep made the startling statement, “After fifteen years... we began again to search for the betrayer. But that was 1960, and by this time the betrayer had died”. She concluded by saying: ‘So we have to resign ourselves to the fact that we will never know who did it’. Vince sat up in shock. Both things couldn’t be true. If Miep had known the betrayer was dead by 1960, she must have known who the betrayer was’ (page 199)

Or thought she knew who the betrayer was, would be a more accurate assessment. Now Miep’s statement has been edited here for effect. Because what she said in between the quoted lines, makes it quite clear what she meant, as it was to the audience that day: That they suspected someone, but there was no evidence. The actual reply was as follows:

Rolf Wolfswinkel: - ...Traitors, yes?
Miep Gies: - But it was 1960 and, in this time, the, er, betrator had died, but who it was, we did not know. I have only eh...
[talks to Wolfswinkel: says in Dutch:] hoe zeg ik, we hadden alleen vermoedens? ['how do I say, we only had suppositions?']
Wolfswinkel: -Supposi...
Miep: -I have only supposed but what can I do now? And the people had died. And Mr. Frank always said to me, ‘Miep, I never want to know the name of this betrator because these people is too, er...'
Wolfswinkel : -'Low...'
Miep: -...too low for me. [he said] I did not want know it and it did not repay my children and mijn vrouw, my, er, woman. And also after the war when we were looking for the man who arrested us, that was Silberbauer in Vienna, and Mr. Wiesenthal searched this man but he did not know his name and he went to Otto Frank and asked the name and Otto Frank gave the wrong name but Wiesenthal was looking for him a whole year and he found him and he went to him. And after I asked Otto, why did you not tell him the true name of this? Why
**did you not tell the true name to Wiesenthal? He said, ‘Miep, listen. The children of this man must go, over the world. And I did not want that they were blamed for her... for his father.”**

Miep forgot or skipped here, that the whole Silberbauer/ Silbernagel- charade of Otto’s started before Wiesenthal ever came on the scene: He already changed the name when he was interviewed for Ernst Schnabel’s *Spur Eines Kindes*, maybe originally because after all, many names in the Diary had been changed as well. He might have seen it as fair play. The names were still pseudonyms in Miep’s own story from 1988, as written by Alison Leslie Gold. Sullivan doesn’t dwell on that. The chapter continues with examples of times Miep made similar statements in the past, from which the conclusion is drawn that Miep, and undoubtedly Otto ‘knew the name of the betrayer’. While to be exact, it should read ‘thought they might know the name of the betrayer, or spoke of a suspected betrayer known to them’, and made statements of the kind to both Cor Suijk of the Anne Frank House, and her and Otto’s friend, the Roman Catholic priest Father John Neiman from Los Angeles.

Pankoke follows up on what he believes to be a discovery and talks to Neiman and Wolfswinkel. Neiman tells him something significant, namely that Otto had made statements to him in the past about knowing the betrayer, while, though it wasn’t entirely clear to him if he meant knowing who the betrayer was, or actually knowing him, he thought it was the latter. According to Carol Ann Lee, Miep had alluded to both Neiman and Cor Suijk that Otto actually knew the man he thought to be the betrayer. Wolfswinkel had the same impression as Neiman, although none of them ever heard a name. This is glossed over in the book.

Pankoke then has a long conversation with Wolfswinkel (in fact, he had several) and the thanks for Wolfswinkel’s time is a page-long exposé on his father, a collaborating policeman, with no bearing to the case. Pankoke is perplexed that the son of a man working for a Referat-Gruppe could have been a friend of Miep Gies’. It doesn’t occur to him to examine that further, which might have given him some insight into a society post-occupation. Neither does he dwell on the variation of reasons that might lead a person to pursue a scholarship in Holocaust literature.

One rather significant aspect that Wolfswinkel related to Pankoke about Miep was that, although a great lady, and much to be respected in terms of honesty, etcetera, she had one oddity. She just could not admit to not knowing something. She’d always say ‘I knew that’, at everything she heard. That, he
warned, made it difficult to establish what she knew in terms of a betrayer and even harder to interpret her statements posthumously. This warning corresponds to remarks by Anne Frank-biographer Melissa Müller, when interviewed by Pankoke. She explicitly warned Pankoke that he should be careful of interpreting vague statements, silences or contradictions of both Miep and Otto. That gatekeeping information was wartime damage. But Pankoke did the opposite.

‘It occurred to me at the time, of course, that Vince Pankoke was intrigued by this sentence into which so much can be puzzled, and which now even made it on the American cover: “Less a mystery unsolved than a secret well kept”’ Melissa Müller wrote to Trouw-journalist Hella Rottenberg. “It is irritating that this statement - torn out of the context of the background conversation at the time - became the motto of their investigation”54.

The Cold Case Team maintains that Miep’s description of the betrayer in 1994 - dead before 1960, with children, fits only Van den Bergh. Lammert Hartog for instance, was dead by 1960 too, but had no living children at that time. Tonny Ahlers had children, but was very much alive in 1960. Nelly Voskuijl was alive and childless. Etcetera.

But everything Miep says, especially the ‘these people were too low’, and his children that should not be blamed, fits one person both Otto and Miep knew before the war down to detail. And that is a man who actually tried to betray Otto Frank before: For ‘slandering the Wehrmacht’ in 1941: Josephus ‘Job’ Jansen.

This failed actor, who once did odd jobs for Otto, who imagined his wife, the one-time promotion lady for Opekta might have had an affair with Otto. Jansen wrote a denunciation of Otto to the SD, and that letter brought Tonny Ahlers into his life. Miep alludes to the ‘betraitor’ as one man, but then says ‘these people’ which sounds like more than one person or even a couple. Why would she include Van den Bergh’s wife in ‘being too low’? It sounds like a throwback of earlier trouble with ‘these people’. But as the Cold Case Team desperately needs this excerpt to frame Van den Bergh later on, it is left out of the book that Jansen was dead by 1960 too (he died in 1952), and his ex-wife ten years later55. Let’s go back to Otto’s letter on his return, typed on the still new, sharp-lettered Erika Tab5. The one the Cold Case Team annotate for chapter 20, and is supposed to be in their possession.
Dear sirs, August 21, 1945

On the subject of Mr <J.M.> Jansen [initials of Jansen inserted by POD officer]

Herewith I am sending you a copy of my writing concerning the subject of A.C. Ahlers <that I>[ins] sent to Scheveningen. I don’t know if Mr. Jansen, aforementioned in my writing, has been caught already, because this is the one that has truly done bad things. I have forgotten his initials, and don’t know where he lives. But this information can be heard from <his>[ins] wife, who has a flower shop on the Amstelveenscheweg (nr 72). She lived separated from her husband, is of Jewish descent and has nothing to do with all of these things mentioned. It will surely be possible to garner information there. Although I hope that Mr. Jansen is behind bars already, if not I hope you will see reason through this letter to find out where he is and pick him up.

Yours respectfully, signed Otto Frank.

So, in this letter Otto is already especially careful to leave Jetje, Jansen’s longsuffering wife, out of his accusation, but he definitely wants Jansen arrested. Jansen and Jetje had six children, and Jansen also had an older son. Jetje’s eldest sons had been deported during the war, not as Jews, but as ‘Schützhaftlinge’; political prisoners. One had been executed in concentration camp Neuengamme56, the survivor had managed to keep himself alive through Auschwitz and KZ Ebensee57 (a subsidiary of concentration camp Mauthausen, not, as Sullivan writes, Dachau). Otto may or may not have known this at the time of the letter, but both he and Miep probably heard this at some point.

The CCT places Jansen in the eastern town of Winterswijk at the time of the raid. Jansen had become a tour manager for the Deutches Theater in den Niederlanden (the name of the theatre group is not mentioned in the book) in 1942 and Winterswijk is supposedly where the theatre props were kept. Shortly after their relocation he and his new partner were arrested in the nearby German town of Münster for having stolen attributes belonging to the theatre. This is why the CCT absolves him of the betrayal. They base themselves on Sytze Van der Zee’s book ‘Vogelvrij, de jacht op de Joodse onderduiker’. However, Van der Zee writes that Jansen relocated to Winterswijk ‘beginning of August’ so it is unclear if this was before or after the raid, but as the raid took place on August 4, it might well be right after. Also, the Cold Case team have omitted the huge brave-face- the show-must-go-on Kraft durch Freude Gala of the 24th of July 1944
in the large ballroom of Hotel Krasnapolsky, Amsterdam\textsuperscript{58}. The Deutches Theater had participated in these galas before, and was now defunct apart from a ‘bunten Abend’ for the Wehrmacht now and then\textsuperscript{59}. Everyone who was anyone in collaborative entertainment would have been either on stage or in the audience that night. \textit{Only ten days and walking distance away from the raid.}

Also Otto and Miep would not have known if Jansen had their address or not. Consider this:

- Miep Gies was Otto’s secretary from 1933 onwards. She knew Jansen and Jetje Jansen-Bremer and their children too. They might have heard the gossip about their father betraying his own sons, which they might well have believed on account of their own experiences with the rancorous Jansen.

- Miep had never met Van den Bergh, or his wife, or his children, and most probably never gave Van den Bergh any thought at all. She did not seem to have involved herself with the affair of the anonymous note and as far as we know, never said anything about it. That she would have meant Van den Bergh or his children during the Q&A in 1994 is quite implausible. Except in a tunnel view, deliberate or not.

- Both Miep and Otto had probably felt sorry for the children, suffering under a dysfunctional father after Otto had to let Jetje go in 1936. In his letter to the POD, Otto specifically mentions Jetje’s innocence. Miep describing the suspected betrayer as ‘too low to bother with’ expressed exactly their opinion of Jansen over the years and it might have been Miep’s opinion of Jetje too, even if it wasn’t Otto’s.

- As Otto thought that perhaps Silberbauer knew who the betrayer was, it is possible he perceived Jansen, or someone like him, to have had better access to the higher echelons of the SD than he did in reality. In the end Silberbauer turned out not to have a clue how the raid came about, hardly remembered the raid at all, made a point of stating that
it had just been another day at work for him, and said something different every time about how it went, so they needn’t have worried.

- Neither Carol Ann Lee’s suspicions of Anton Ahlers (and with it, the Jansen saga), nor Melissa Müller’s of Lena Hartog- Van Bladeren had seen the light of day yet when Miep toured the US. The only suspect considered had been Willem Van Maaren, but Miep, despite disliking him, never thought he was the betrayer. The Jansen denunciation affair was solely known to Otto and his helpers.

- Jansen was deceased by the time Wiesenthal went hunting for Silberbauer and his ex-wife died around the time Wiesenthal started looking. Otto would have certainly heard of Jetje’s death. Of the two children, two sisters were similar in age to the son who had died in Neuengamme, but then there were a younger boy and girl, only in their teens when they lost their mother, just before the new investigation started. Where Otto was heedful in 1945 not to see their mother hurt by his complaints, he would be equally sensitive to these vulnerable youngsters, now Anne’s age, eighteen years later.

- It’s possible neither thought specifically of Jansen as the betrayer outright, but somehow regarded him as a sort of example of what they imagined the betrayer to be, and why it would be pointless to pursue someone like Jansen from the sixties onwards. ‘It wouldn’t have brought Otto his children or his woman back’, was the bottom line of what Miep said. Something else had become more important to them by then. Anne’s heritage.

Reader, don’t misunderstand me. I far from want to throw yet another suspect of the betrayal into the wild mix. I’m pretty convinced no concrete evidence will ever be found as to who or what caused the raid as there is simply too little information, as the CCT found out at their peril. The existing documentation has been scrutinised so many times over. This is just an insight into how the Cold Case Team operated.
6. Distortion and Appropriation

Joop van Wijk worked on the biography of his mother, ‘Bep Voskuijl, Beyond the Silence’, for a good six years, jointly with Flemish journalist Jeroen De Bruyn. Bep was the youngest of the helpers, and probably closest to Anne. After the war, Bep shied away from too much attention, and struggled with her grief over the fate of the occupants of the Annex, Anne’s in particular. She kept in lifelong contact with Otto. Part of the biography, which first appeared in the Netherlands in 2015, deals with Bep’s younger sister Nelly, the collaborating black sheep of the family. Anne, cooped up in the Annex, probably revelled a little in Bep’s serial on Nelly’s bad antics, and mentioned them in her diary more than once. For instance when Nelly ran off to work at a German base in France. Joop van Wijk felt the story should not be whitewashed and wrote that for Bep, the worry over her sister’s lack of political reliability was an added pressure both during and after the war. After scrapped diary entries by Anne on Nelly surfaced, he had interviewed new-found witnesses and analysed memories he had previously not understood, Joop finally concluded that his aunt had to be viewed as one of the long list of suspects of the betrayal. His book understandably caused a rift in his family. Van Wijk shared much of the documentation and knowledge he’d gathered over the years with the CCT, hoping for a breakthrough, for final clarity, whatever the outcome.

In his own book, Joop described how he had tried to broach the subject of the war with his aunt Nelly when he renewed contact with her in 1996. But that had proven impossible. On two (not three, as Sullivan writes) occasions Nelly had promptly swooned, or pretended to faint. This of course was long before Joop learned the full facts on Nelly, or suspected her of involvement with the raid. Nelly died in 2001, eight years before Jeroen De Bruyn first contacted Joop van Wijk to talk about the possibility of a biography of Bep. Yet Sullivan writes:

‘Nelly understood that he was writing a book about his mother, but said that it was difficult to speak about those times, she greatly regretted that period of her life’ (page 179)
This timewarp makes way for a claim that alleges that Joop van Wijk told the Cold Case Team that he tried to talk about the *raid* with Nelly when she was still alive, not just the *war as a whole*.

‘Then rather startlingly, Joop recounted that “One of the last times I visited her and mentioned Anne Frank and the raid on the Annex, she had a serious fainting spell”’ and: ‘Of course the most surprising aspect of Joop’s account is that it seems that all he had to do was mention the Annex and Nelly fainted’ (page 179)

They annotate the quote as coming from an interview on the 7th of December, 2018, as Sullivan writes, a freezing day when Joop and his wife travelled to Amsterdam to speak to Vincent and Brendan. She also writes that Joop wrote in the biography that Nelly had fainted on earlier occasions at questions to do with the war, not the raid, which reads as a safety catch. Sullivan continues:

“The Cold Case Team was left wondering: Was Nelly hiding things with her fainting spells and her refusal to speak? Or did Joop, already convinced his aunt was guilty, have tunnel vision?” and

“Calling on his twenty-seven years of experience as an FBI- undercover agent, Vince said he’d learned to read people- for his own safety. He liked Joop very much, but he felt he was somehow obsessed with proving his aunt Nelly’s guilt.” (both page 179)

When the book suddenly came out after a long silence, and he read these fabrications for the first time, Joop was stunned. He does not feel he wants or even *can* discuss the affair of the Cold Case Team at length, at the present time. All he wants to say is that because the interview was filmed, he couldn’t have anticipated that his words would be sensationally distorted in a book publication four years later. His story on Nelly’s fainting as written in his mother’s biography is how it was and he never told it any other way.

Two days after the book came out, Joop van Wijk and his wife had one last video call with Vince Pankoke. Joop confronted Pankoke with the corrupted
statements. Pankoke blamed them on Sullivan’s interpretation and translation errors. He also denied he’d called van Wijk tunnel-visioned and obsessed. He promised both issues would be amended in future prints. He had no reply to van Wijk’s answer that the damage had already been done. Yes, it was a hurtful abuse of trust, a stab in the back for his efforts. Joop van Wijk understood it was applied so that the CCT could devaluate his research. He intends to collect his thoughts and put these into his own words again, to describe everything that has happened since he and De Bruyn started working on his mother’s history. Their experiences with the Cold Case Team will certainly be a part of it all.

The treatment of Joop van Wijk by the CCT is similar to that of Van den Bergh’s granddaughter Mirjam, of Rolf Wolfswinkel, and of the Van Hoeve family. Information is elicited, information is appropriated, it is cherry-picked or distorted, and sources find themselves besmirched in the book afterwards. The pattern has its own distinct psychology, eerily reminiscent of Schepers’ projective reversals. The need to excuse improprieties.

The memoir
The parts of the book that focus on ‘the greengrocer’, on Max Meiler and the couple Richard and Ruth Weisz are professed to be based on Hendrik Van Hoeve’s witness memoires (in private domain status at the AFS) and interviews with his son. However, the rendition of these turn out to be severely flawed. The book claims Van Hoeve wrote that he saw Max Meiler in the camps twice, once in Vught and once at the Heinkel-works at Oranienburg. But in his memoir, Van Hoeve only mentions Meiler twice, once in sad remembrance at the start: ‘My friend who also died in a concentration camp’ and once in the instance where he gives the account of meeting a clearly unwell Meiler beseeching him to call him by his assumed name De Groot. However, this, sole, interaction took place in Oranienburg, not Vught. So the second meeting, where Max supposedly looks terrible because he was ‘found out’, suggesting torture that might have led to betrayal, is pure fiction. One that doesn’t fit with the documentation, which shows Meiler was certainly in Vught under his own name\(^60\), and also deported to Sachsenhausen (Oranienburg) and onwards to Neuengamme as Meiler. Van Hoeve’s true account does fit the documentation, and also, importantly, Van Hoeve gives a clear probability towards Meiler’s condition, one that the CCT omits, and that is that Meiler was already suffering from dysentery
in Oranienburg\textsuperscript{61}. He was most likely delirious. The CCT theory on the basis of the assumed name, suggests he was in the Vught \textit{revier} under an assumed name, which they don’t give. Annotation 11 says: “\textit{Inventory number/obtained during call, Dutch Red Cross Archive}”. It is unclear what that means and the inventory number is not provided either.

On the grounds of barely checkable sources, one being a since-deleted blog, a supplementary tale is spun here to scrutinise the subjects of this sad history for their possible motives and opportunities of betrayal.

The CCT makes much of the fact that at a certain point during their incarceration at Westerbork, the Weisz couple moves from the punishment barrack 67 to the ‘diamond status’ barrack 85 and that somehow they had rid themselves of their penal status in Westerbork. Sullivan, who presumes that Richard Weisz was a greengrocer too, as his Jewish Council Card states he worked at a relative’s greengrocer’s shop (to any knowledgeable viewer, a previous ruse to be \textit{sperred}: a \textit{sper} means being held back from deportation as contributing to food distribution for a while) bluntly writes:

\begin{quote}
\textit{“To make that move, the Weiszes would have to have done something extraordinary. Or perhaps someone with influence had interceded on their behalf (...) The Cold Case Team knew that “penal” prisoners could change their status for a significant fee (one survivor of Westerbork had paid a fee of 80,000 guilders) (...) The Weiszes, however did not seem to have that kind of money, which suggests that they might have paid with a different currency: \textit{information’}. (page 212)}
\end{quote}

First of all: The 80,000 guilders is the highest amount found as paid to the Contact Committee in the applicable documentation anywhere. It was asked in 1943 (when Westerbork was full) for the fabrication, by the Contact Committee, of a Christian baptism, to be accredited by an actual vicar, and a backdated write-in in his church books. That was supposed to provide a \textit{sper} for a whole, extended family\textsuperscript{62}. Nothing to do with penal status and a completely different situation.

Tragically, and as \textit{was explained to the CCT} by Guido Abuys, Westerbork curator\textsuperscript{63}, people didn’t pay to move to more comfortable barracks, but because they were made to believe that ridding themselves of their penal status would
help them beyond Westerbork. It didn’t, as we can see from the fate of the Weiszes: the place where Richard Weisz perished was possibly one of the most gruesome places one could end up in the whole array of concentration camps. Before the occupation, Richard Weisz was the sole importer and representative of the German Gehr company, that produced plastic and plastic articles, and he himself was a manufacturer of the same. His wife was a designer. They lived in the upper middle-class Van Eyckstraat close by the later Zentralstelle and the SD-headquarters. A so-called L-claim to the name of Richard Weisz proves an outstanding credit, post-war, on valuable goods relinquished to the LiRo, the formerly Jewish bank that the Nazis used to rob and extort Jews.

They were not in commercial hiding - the Van Hoeves did not make money on provisioning their keep. So it’s unlikely that they were completely financially destitute by the time of their arrest, and so they would still have had means to buy off their penal status - the Liro had an office in Westerbork for that purpose - especially as the price went down progressively in 1944: The Contact commissie (aka Contact afdeling) in their defence document speaks of 2000 guilders per person - or the same currency in diamonds - or usable goods from May 1944 onwards. The example of ‘a good sewing machine’ is also given, and this is uncontested by the counter-testimony against the CC/CA by Max de Jong. For more details about the mal-application of testimonies regarding Westerbork, for instance on the mail situation and on ‘deals’ with family members of inmates of Westerbork please see Chronology: Chapter 42

Right after their arrest, in their holding cell at the Euterpestraat, Ruth Weisz slipped Hendrik Van Hoeve a gold ring with two brilliant cut diamonds to hide in the seam of his coat, for fear she would be punished extra for still having retained it - which says something about their earlier LiRo dealings and what their relinquished valuables might have entailed. Where Van Hoeve wrote about being taken out of the cell, and his last view of the frightened couple cowering in a corner of the dirty holding tank, he follows it up immediately with a fierce reminder never to forget this. He also remarks that they ‘had not seen a German yet’ at that point: That their captors and interrogators were all Dutch, or, as Van Hoeve pointedly writes ‘at least, that’s what they called themselves’.
In the end, the Van Hoeves, the Weiszes and Max Meiler are let off the hook as potential betrayers of the Frank and van Pels families by the CCT in their pursuit of the Van den Bergh angle. Yet the implication, especially of the Weisz couple as likely betrayers remains. On contrived probability and distorted documentation. Sullivan writes: ‘**Both died in the Eastern European camps. It is not known if they were together or separated and exactly when they perished**’. (page 213). It’s abundantly clear the Weisz’s were separated. And though deported to Auschwitz originally in the same transport, like Anne, neither died in an Eastern European Camp. Richard Weisz died in January in Baden-Wurttemberg, Southern Germany, in all-men’s camp Hailfingen, while Ruth most likely died during or soon after a death march somewhere between Flossenburg and the Austrian border in Bavaria, some 400 kilometers apart in Western Europe.

Now Hendrik ‘Henk’ Van Hoeve was not a regular shopkeeper that blundered into the underground by accident. He started his greengrocer’s business after an adventurous pre-war life that included a stint as a driver in the Foreign Legion. This led to the loss of his Dutch citizenship, only grudgingly reinstated after the war on grounds of his resistance, which makes his comments about collaborating policemen ‘calling themselves Dutch’ all the more poignant.

The real-life Van Hoeve, accurately depicted, would have been far harder to cast as someone who might have divulged too much to others, than the benign greengrocer in Sullivan’s book. He was a tough resister, with a deep distrust of authority and a loathing of all totalitarian ideology; be it fascist or communist. Even in later life, though disabled because of frozen feet at the end of his concentration camp ordeal, he retained his fighting spirit. Though formally uneducated, Van Hoeve’s memoir shows him to have been a man of sharp intelligence and observatory skill. His witness statement-type memoir is a profound, disturbing account of hardship and survival, but also of his mentality and ideas. He wrote it in anger in the late fifties in response to the pleas to release the so-called Breda Four. To abuse this harrowing document, by this hero, which the family graciously permitted the CCT to view -in the hope of providing insight into the arrest of the Franks and the Weiszes- by casting aspersions onto the very people whose suffering is relayed in it, is no less than an act of heartless perfidy.
7. Possibilities not pursued.
As we have seen, some of the worst parts of the book are where Nazi sources are taken at face value, and appear in the book undeliberated and unresearched. The worst example is towards the end of the book, in Chapter 41, A Bombshell, where an anecdote by Westerbork Commander Gemmeker is dished up. In this truly abject passage Abraham Asscher, head of the Jewish Council, is alleged to have had the fiancée of his son deported to Auschwitz because he didn’t think she was suitable for his son. One would think one wouldn’t have to resort to Nazi trope to paint a grim enough picture of Asscher, but Sullivan prefers her examples to have maximum shock value. So the name of the fiancée was ‘judified’ to Weinrother (while in reality the name of her ex-husband was Von Weijrother. Her correct name was Julia Snijders) The betrothed concerned were not youngsters under parental ministration, but adult individuals of independent means, both in their forties with previous marriages, and the groom’s father would certainly have had other things on his mind during their time in Westerbork. They were deported together, survived, married soon after the war and moved to New York. Sullivan writes that Asscher’s doing ‘all came out’ upon their survival but all that had come out was that the Gemmeker’s story was a lie -they were interviewed by the POD while staying at the house of the accused- as the CCT could have found in the same document they found the anecdote in in the first place. Flippant rendering of this Nazi-Kaffeeklatsch promptly lead to virulent antisemitic utterances on social media, including towards current members of the Asscher family in public life.

Such as from the main editor of weblog De Dagelijkse Standaard, Michiel van de Galiën, on Twitter: “Jesus! I’m listening to the new book on Anne Frank and hear that Abraham Asscher, the grandfather of PVDA’s Lodewijk Asscher had the fiancée of one of his sons sent to Auschwitz because he didn’t want her as a daughter-in-law! Incredible! What an animal!” (Jan. 21, 2022) - 223 likes, 95 shares. Abraham Asscher, by the way, was Lodewijk Asscher’s great-grandfather. Serving this vicious lie up had no other purpose than to illustrate the villainy of the leaders of the Jewish Council in their cementing of the Van den Bergh narrative.

The hungry boy
Karin Stevense is a sociologist and blogger who has brought many names in the Joods Monument back from obscurity by researching who the entries were, and writing something about their lives. One of her primary sources is the digitalised Amsterdam City Archive. The Meldingsrapporten Politie, the scanned daybooks of the police stations are part of that. These reports can be bulk
downloaded in PDF’s from the Stadsarchief\textsuperscript{75}, so they must have been part of the CCT’s electronic filing and A.I. system. However in the following case that system failed against some spare time human effort. Stevense knows these archives like the back of her hand, and was therefore intrigued by the chapter in the book (23, the Nanny) about the arrest of ‘Jansje Theunissen’s’ mother, which the Cold Case team investigate as a unique occurrence and the possibility of her exchanging information for release, while she was released promptly (and as a registered collaborator) for having a child alone at home. Stevense however noted that \textit{on the same day, and in the same report} that 3\textsuperscript{rd} of August 1944, the day before the raid on the Prinsengracht 263, a little boy right across the street, on the corner of the Bloemgracht and the Prinsengracht, a child of NSB-members, was arrested at a market hall for stealing food. He was collected that night by his father. There were several contact points during this incidence: With the boy, with his father, with collaborative officers. She noted that it is infinitely more plausible that either the boy or the father would have alerted the police to ‘food irregularities’ around the number 263 right across the road -the view from their window in fact, and made remarks to the effect of ‘You arrest my boy, while across the road...’ than ‘Jansje Theunissen’s mother’ having known anything or the need to talk.

The boy’s family -the boy might well still be alive- did not turn up in the CCT’s ‘Residence Project’, because that didn’t stretch to the other side of the Prinsengracht. The CCT and the writer of the book disregard how many people devote their spare time to the online archives open to the public in the multi-million project ‘Oorlogsbronnen’, the existence of which they totally ignore. Furthermore, in order to obscure the fact that the data on NSB members are easily found online, and that the Amsterdam Stadsarchief, again, already made an extensive map of collaborators in Amsterdam years ago, the CCT claims they received their data from Yad Vashem. Denied by Yad Vashem’s David Cahn who wished to take the opportunity to add that their researchers, including chief historian Dan Michman, hold a low opinion of this book and its skewed data.\textsuperscript{76}

Two important details on the extensive family clan, of ‘Jansje’ herself apparently eluded the CCT: combination of professions of ‘Jansje’s father and other family members, which granted knowledge of the amenities of many of the houses on that part of the Prinsengracht: undertakers and chimneysweeps! They also ignore a line between this family and the extended family of helpers Voskuijl\textsuperscript{77} –
in a child custody battle. They also failed to examine whether her father, in his turns for the NSKK, was involved with collaborative entertainment. The Kraft durch Freude outfits -that Job Jansen worked for as a tour manager- were all driven by NSKK drivers in their grey buses. Her father was also a pianist, and his friend. librettist Niek van Kampen, the husband of ‘Jansjes’s’ nanny, served as a driver for KdF. Did they know Jansen? If so he could well have known that ‘Gies and Co’ on the Prinsengracht was Opekta. The book does not elaborate.

The Cold Case Team was not the first party ‘Jansje Theunissen’ volunteered her story to, so the averment by the CCT that Jansje didn’t know the extent of her parents’ collaboration is not very credible. That such an old, known and improbable scenario, volunteered to the team, but barely researched, made it into the book, seems to render the choice of scenarios they are ‘whittled down from’ rather... random. And beggars the question how many scenarios were duly investigated. We have seen very little of the proclaimed thirty scenarios they investigated. None of the examples in the book are new.

Community
It is curious that while the CCT apparently expected Jews at the time, even those in hiding, to be able to communicate freely and to know of each other’s whereabouts, in other words, remain a community, it is the collaborators in the tale that are viewed as isolated individuals. As if they weren’t the ones who formed communities during those years with the ample opportunity to socialize, work and travel. Little to no attention was spent on discovering lines between those investigated. Not just between ‘Jansje Theunissen’s’ family and the ‘first betrayer’ Jansen. There is also neighbour Mater. The CCT disperse of him as ‘probably not very active’ in his NSB-membership. But Mater did ask snoopy questions about Prinsengracht 263. CCT take detective Van Helden’s word for it that Mater wasn’t very active as an NSB-member. But the Maters did flee the city after ‘Crazy Tuesday’ in September 1944. His wife committed suicide on the morning after Hitler’s death was broadcast, which does suggest a rather deeply ingrained commitment to Nazi ideology after all. Back to the police files, the Meldings-rapporten at the Stadsarchief. Mater kept reporting sugar thefts. An awful lot pertaining to sugar went on around the Achterhuis. Willem van Maaren accused Miep Gies of ‘sugar hoarding’, Miep Gies said that Willem van Maaren stole from a collective sugar cache. And then there was Tonny Ahlers sugar
racket. As with Stevense’s example, food and foodstuffs was becoming an ever-growing force of tension during 1944. Months before the ‘hunger winter’, the scarcity of food was already a major issue and so a large bone of discontent between people. The CCT don’t seem to have taken food into any consideration at all. Which brings us to distribution and rationing.

Probing nothing
In Chapter 29, ‘Probing Memory’, the CCT, supposedly want to find out whether Silberbauer and his henchmen had known about the Jews in the building or not. One aspect of Schnabel’s manuscript, Silberbauer’s cry “Wo sind die Juden” is verified (Miep and Bep both acknowledge to have heard it) while statements in the same manuscript and book, about the searching of boxes and securing of files of papers by one of the Dutch detectives (we can safely assess this to have been Gringhuis, for such was his job) are ignored. For all we know Silberbauer yelled “Wo sind die Juden” at every raid to see what would happen.

More importantly:
The main, well evidenced points that Gertjan Broek of the AFS makes in his 2016 report, on the possible connections between the raid and rationing fraud are left completely unaddressed. For instance, that representatives of the company, one Daatzelaar and one Brouwer and their network, that black marketed the rationing coupons which both the inhabitants of the Annex and those ducking out of labour in Germany were dependent on, was investigated by the very unit that policeman Gringhuis worked for at the time of the raid. The economic research unit of the Recherchecentrale. These very pertinent facts, that one would think would be central in a Cold Case investigation, and a major scenario of scrutiny, are all wilfully obscured by the CCT, as it doesn’t fit their simplistic Jewhunters- and- betrayers- narrative. They ignore the remarkable fact that Daatzelaar, who was arrested in March of 1944, and interrogated extensively by the Zwolle police after his arrest, was meant to appear in court in Haarlem on July 26th 1944, but that the case was called off for unknown reasons, which is too suspicious a fact not to be pursued further by a truly openminded Cold Case Team.

Anne had even written in her diary that this Daatzelaar was one of the people they had to keep extra quiet for. Though a black marketeer, he had NSB-
affiliations too. Instead of looking further into the main arguments of Broek’s report, everything is reduced to a yell on the stairs. The Cold Case Team maintains that they have evidence that Gringhuis was placed back to detachment with the SD just before the raid – Vincent Pankoke claims they found something to this effect in his archive at the Nationaal Archief, but didn’t specify where. I’ve studied Gringhuis’ files thoroughly and searched for this item specifically, but only found evidence to the contrary. Such as that Gringhuis had had the offer to transfer to Groningen with Kaper’s men after ‘crazy Tuesday’ in September 1944, but had been happy to ‘stay where he was’ and that was in the economic special research branch under Head Inspector Van der Burght. Pankoke however mentions Daatzelaar twice in his rebuttals, while Daatzelaar is not mentioned once in the book. If there is evidence that Gringhuis was a member of Kaper’s unit at the time (why would he if he was promoted to Staatsrechercheur?) and there is also evidence to exclude the culpability of Daatzelaar, why weren’t these findings expanded on in the book? For that would have been truly new information.

The Cold Case Team claimed to have ‘started from scratch’. Their aim was to find details that were overlooked, or possibly even swept under the carpet in the past. One would think that the one thing they would have started with is investigating and subsequently clearing the helpers. Viewed purely objectively, any of them could have had motive, knowledge and opportunity. They should have cleared the possibility of amenities giving the hiders away, for instance: Was the sewage overflow that still went into the Prinsengracht at the time, visible from the side of the canal in the summer? Could it be noticed if the toilet was flushed at night that way? What of Pfeffer’s letters, against the rules of the Annex, to his fiancée Lottie, that the inhabitants of the Annex rowed about? We’ve seen nothing on it. If it was investigated, why wasn’t the book about ticking off all those kind of details instead of rehashing all previous books? If the criteria for evidence are those of the CCT ‘s betrayal theory on Van den Bergh, one could contrive and solve a hundred and one betrayal and discovery possibilities from public files alone. If the criteria are those of professional research in any discipline, there is nothing.
The central theory of the book is:

The hidden Jews in the Annex and their helpers were betrayed. There are no other possibilities than betrayal. They were arrested because of a tip to the Sicherheitsdienst, by an SS officer and two Dutch policemen detached to the SD, who knew there were Jews on the premises. This tip must have come through lists of Jewish hiding places, formerly in possession of the Jewish Council through their perusal of letters, of inmates of deportation camp Westerbork to relatives in hiding. Jewish notary Arnold Van den Bergh had access to those lists through his membership of the Jewish Council. He regained those lists as an insurance policy to his safety. Though he managed to hide his children successfully through the resistance, he saved himself and his wife from deportation this way. Van den Bergh had received the amount of 200,000 guilders commission as a notary in the infamous 1941 Goudstikker art dealership sale through Alois Miedl, speculator, art dealer and strawman for Herman Göring. Because of the earnings and Nazi affiliations through the Goudstikker deal, Van den Bergh had already enjoyed a degree of protection from persecution through Nazi contacts, ranging from Jew-hunter Eddy Moesbergen, who even served him with a warning of upcoming arrest, to the highest echelons of Lages and aus der Fünten. His affluence and Nazi contacts also provided him with a Calmeyer status (to be declared non-Jewish) which fell through after an adversary, the ambitious NSB-notary J Anton Schepers, betrayed him and he was on his own. He therefore had to use the lists in his possession.

In 1945, Otto Frank received the anonymous note implicating notary Van den Bergh in the betrayal of his family a year before. The wording of this note indicated it was written by a person formerly on the inside of the persecution structure; probably an employee of the Zentralstelle für Jüdische Auswanderung, commonly abbreviated by insiders to Jüdische Auswanderung or J.A. Otto Frank took this note seriously enough -one can even suspect a driving motivation as a means to handling his grief- to visit one of the policemen, Gringhuis, who had arrested him in prison to ask about Van den Bergh. This policeman also knew van den Bergh somehow, and said he vouched for his integrity. Otto’s agenda shows that he made this visit on the 6th of December 1945. So when the note was received and first discussed, nobody knew who Otto was, as Anne’s diary had not yet published. Otto Frank in this shocking discovery through the anonymous note, and for fear of antisemitism, damage to the community and his further ambitions for the diary, consulted his Jewish friend Ab Cauvern and notary Van Hasselt, but excluded his business companion, friend, helper and foundation co-
founder Johannes Kleiman. Otto covered up the betrayal that caused the death of his family himself, all because the betrayer was a fellow Jew and in the interests of the diary publication. Because Kleiman wasn’t Jewish and might not concur to Jewish covering-up, and so, unlike Miep Gies, who did (living up to Silberbauer’s apt assessment she was a limitless Judenfreundin) Kleiman would not learn about the note until twelve to thirteen years after it was sent, when Otto, for unknown reasons that aren’t elaborated on by the CCT, and around the time of the founding of the Anne Frank Stichting, typed up a copy of the note. The subterfuge on the knowledge of Van den Bergh as a betrayer was supposedly continued by Otto and Miep for the rest of their lives, with a slip-up now and then, and continued by a browbeating Anne Frank Fonds, aided and abetted by Dutch authorities until the CCT blew off the cover thanks to an experienced sleuth’s acquired sixth senses and musings. And state of the art hardware and forensics of course.

The historic reality from the documentation:

There has never been any hard evidence of a betrayal and there is none now. There are contradicting statements to what led to the raid. Through digitalization and better options for cross referencing, slowly other possibilities to the background of the raid have become apparent, the strongest one of recent date is that the raid might have been the result of an investigation into distribution irregularities. The presence of policeman Gringhuis, the very one that Otto was supposed to have visited in prison, indicates that. That Gringhuis was not detached to the SD at the time, but working for the Recherchecentrale that investigated a specific case tied to two representatives of Gies & Co / Opekta, and that he searched the premises for files and papers during the raid makes that more credible. Also this would fit with the famous phone call to Dettmann: It would have come from one of Inspector Van der Burght’s office staff in the Hague. There is no evidence whatsoever that the anonymous note was sent in 1945. It is much more likely it was sent in late 1957 or early 1958. The addressing of what was commonly referred to by all as the Zentralstelle, as ‘de Jüdische Auswanderung’ or J.A. does not suggest the author to be an insider, on the contrary, it is a particular idiosyncrasy shown in the documentation to have been used by only one man: Van den Bergh’s adversary J. Anton Schepers, who was certified as insane. There was no notation in Otto Frank’s agenda to the visit in the prison, because he spoke with the POD, the police department that hunted down war criminals, on that day. There was no visit to the prison, as the conversation between Gringhuis and Frank about the note is an interpretation error on the part of biographer Carol Ann Lee in 2002. Nothing even faintly
resembling it in wording can be found anywhere else than on page 18-19 of Van Helden’s Rijksrecherche report. But: with a different meaning -indicating different people- than Lee’s transcription. Ab Cauvern was not noted in the agenda either, for the ab in the December 6th entry was a German proposition meaning as of or from. Otto’s friend and notary Van Hasselt didn’t send Kleiman the note. Otto did not consult with Van Hasselt in 1945; there is no evidence he even knew Van Hasselt right after the war. Kleiman was the one to find the note at the Prinsengracht in 1957 or 1958 and certainly the one to read it out to Van Hasselt, because that’s what he writes to Otto. He might have also read it out to Otto over the phone. Otto anyway typed up a copy upon reception. Kleiman therefore knew about the note before anyone else.

The typeface of the copy of the note in comparison to earlier and later typing on the same machine, show the note copy must have been typed somewhere in the fifties. If Miep Gies had any particular person in mind when she spoke of a betrayal suspect with children who was dead by 1960 at the 1994 Wallenberg Awards, it is infinitely more plausible she meant Job Jansen, whom she knew and who had tried to betray Otto Frank before, than Van den Bergh, who she didn’t know. Van den Bergh had no Nazi friends and had never met either Gringhuis, Moesbergen, aus der Fünten or Lages and had no protection from them, directly or indirectly. The only source of that are post-war letters from Schepers. Gringhuis never said anything about Van den Bergh at all (the line about integrity was Van Helden’s assessment), Moesbergen claims he was late in arresting him after a tip and tries to pass that on as lenience, and aus der Fünten and Lages state they had no clue who Van den Bergh was and that there were no lists such as described that they know of. It is hard to believe that two main culprits to the mass deportations would not have known about lists that concerned up to ‘a thousand’ people (page 268-269). The statement is hearsay upon hearsay, and no-one ever took it seriously to follow up on before. Aus der Funten and Lages statements denying they knew Van den Bergh, omitted by the Cold Case team and the author, are central in one of the most important dossiers to the case. They were made at a point in time when it would have been highly beneficial to them if they had been able to state they did know Van den Bergh and there were lists. Even if there had been lists of hiding addresses, of which there is zero evidence, it is highly unlikely that the Prinsengracht 263 would have been on them as the hidden and their helpers had very little outside help, no connection to organised resistance and there is no indication, let alone evidence there were Jews in Westerbork who knew where they were. Even Hendrik Van Hoeve only suspected there were hiders in the Annex. He wasn’t certain and he didn’t know who they were. The Cold Case Team assumes far too much hobnobbing
between resisters in that respect, while the need-not-to-know principle was universal.
The part of the Jewish Council that Van den Bergh was involved with had nothing to do with Westerbork. The CCT team claim that Van den Bergh’s granddaughter didn’t know whether her grandparents had been in hiding. Yet in two meetings which the CCT fail to mention, she did tell them, and even told them where that was. Even if Van den Bergh had access to bartering material, being in hiding meant he had reason nor opportunity to use it. Sullivan’s claim that Van den Bergh was ‘excluded from Jewish society’ upon which she expresses her surprise he could be buried in a Jewish cemetery is nonsense; he was never personally indited by the Jewish Honour Court. They judged the whole of the Jewish Council, but Van den Bergh took up his work with Jewish charities again quite soon after the war.
Everything else is far-fetched chimera and in the line of the book both Otto Frank and Miep Gies are cast as liars and connivers, while validated resisters, helpers of Jews and holocaust victims are slandered as possible betrayers.

So the presented conclusion, quoting the blurb on the back of the book: ‘An international team has finally solved the mystery that has haunted generations since the end of the Second World War’ is disgracefully untrue.

Following: A chronology of all the Chapters, in brief description, with issues where applicable.
9. Chronology of the chapters

With this chronology I want to provide an overview of the line and the issues in the book. Some issues that are briefly covered have already been expanded on in the previous articles, some descriptions of the chapters are a little lengthier where furnished with comment and examples.

I apologise beforehand for some necessary repetitions, where certain lines of narrative are intercut with others in the book itself, the story harks back to previous claims, and this is the only way to make the scope of the manipulations manifest.

Part One

Preface: 1 annotation, 4th of May 2019 speech by Femke Halsema, mayor of Amsterdam. We read that numerous professional consultants have offered their expertise. On the very first page, in summing up the outline of the “Anne Frank story”, Sullivan writes: 'The group was eventually betrayed'.
But this is a Cold Case Team investigation, starting all over, all possibilities open. That there was a betrayal in the first place remains unestablished at this point – and remains unestablished. Here it’s presented as fact from the start. We are introduced to the initiator of the project, Thijs Bayens, and his background: Bayens’ grandparents supposedly hid many Jews in transit.

Chapter 1. The Raid and the Green Policeman. 7 annotations, all to pre-existing literature (published sources). One of three chapters on the raid. Erroneous identification of the role and place of work of policeman Gezinus Gringhuis at that time, that is consequently upheld through the book to serve the CCT theory. In the same vein is the continuous simplification of what the departments under the Referat IV B4 entailed, reducing it to one generic ‘Jew hunting unit’. The Sicherheitsdienst and the Sicherheitspolizei are often interchanged throughout the book. In one instance even the Feldgendarmerie (military police) are attributed with Jewhunting. See: The Note and the Timing of the note

Chapter 2. The Diary of Anne Frank 8 annotations, all to pre-existing literature (published sources)
Chapter 3. The Cold Case Team. 1 annotation. Introduction of the team, introducing Pieter Van Twisk by way of his grandfather’s claim of a resistance past through a (self-representative) CABS-form, which Sullivan calls a ‘system card’ (OVCG Verzetsbetrokkenen, Houwen) but isn’t actually one.88 As with Bayens, and the repeated status of Vince Pankoke’s father as serviceman in the US Army during WW2, serving up a sufficiently righteous pedigree of the leaders of the CCT was apparently deemed necessary for representational purposes.

Chapter 4. The Stakeholders 3 annotations, one CCT-interview, one explanation, one radio broadcast. An interview the CCT had with Jan Van Kooten, at the time 2016- Director of the Dutch National Remembrance, explaining the structure of the organisations involved with Anne Frank’s legacy This chapter further contains a riveting but rather histrionic - and as it turns out, false89- account of the Cold Case Team’s meeting with the Anne Frank Fonds in Basel. Erroneous footnote to page 25: On the copyright of the diaries: “Now held by Otto’s nephews and nieces, including Buddy and Stephen Elias”; Buddy Elias died in 2015, a year before the Cold Case Team commenced, Stephen Elias died in the same year as Otto Frank: 1980. As covered in: Luxury Hotels and Difficult Questions

Chapter 5. Let’s See What the Man Can Do! 9 annotations, all to pre-existing literature (published sources). The February 1941 strike described as ‘the only mass protest against the deportation of Jews to be organised by non-Jews’ (page 33-34) is incorrect, an interpretation of Sullivan’s. The first of several - artificial divisions made between Jews and non-Jews in the book. Another recurrent problem is an incorrect juxtaposition between ethnicity and nationality. Confusingly, this line of thinking premieres in a chapter that recounts that the foremost reason for Otto Frank to leave Germany was that he did not want to see his daughters grow up in a segregated society, with the example of Margot Frank and other children being made to sit apart in kindergarten.

Chapter 6. An Interlude of Safety 10 annotations, all to pre-existing literature. 9 published sources, 1 NIOD-interview. The Frank family in their years on the Merwedeplein
Chapter 7. The Onslaught 14 annotations, all to pre-existing published sources. 13 published sources, 1 State Department US memorandum on the control of immigrants. The start of the occupation.

Chapter 8. Prinsengracht 263 4 annotations, all to previously published sources. The company moves to its new premises. The plan hatches. The business is ‘Aryanised’ by signing it over to Jan Gies. ERRONEOUS explanation of the Aryanisation: ‘Had the company remained Jewish, it would have been liquidated (…) But it had become Dutch’ (page 49-50) Dutch is not an antonym to Jewish-led. Otto’s company was always Dutch. The requirement wasn’t to become Dutch. It had been Aryan-washed. Un-Jewed. But Dutch, as much as before. Mix-ups between nationality and ethnicity occur in several instances in the book.

Chapter 9. the Hiding 13 annotations. All to pre-existing literature (published sources)

Chapter 10. You Were Asked, You Said Yes. 16 annotations. All still to pre-existing literature (published sources). The hiding and the helpers.

Chapter 11. A Harrowing Incident. 7 annotations, again are all to pre-existing literature (published sources). This chapter deals with a series of break-ins that occurred in the warehouse of Prinsengracht 263. This is where one might begin to wonder what happened to the aim of finding and examining previously unearthed information. This applies to several other chapters, such as Chapters 15, 16, and 22 too. As covered in: Possibilities not Persued.

Chapter 12. Anatomy of a Raid. 32 annotations are all to pre-existing literature (published sources) except one, which accounts for 9 notes: The Rijksrecherche Procesverbaal by Arend Van Helden, 1963-64, version NIOD version doc. van Maaren, that the CCT annotates as ‘State Department of Criminal Investigation’. Second chapter on the raid. The self-proclaimed ‘exact’ timeline, construed by the CCT however, claims to have utilised ‘witness statements, police reports, press interviews, and private correspondence’. While appearing to minutely and exactly deconstruct the different statements on the raid (‘Why did Silberbauer say Jews, four Jews or eight Jews in different instances?’) what the timeline
actually does is re-establish old suppositions and officialise and re-establish doubtful assertions beneficial to the Cold Case Team theory as they see fit. No other police reports or personal correspondence than the Rijksrecherche report is annotated: It’s ‘compared’ to previous depictions in different books. Several details (bicycles, German numberplates) are not to be found in any of the sources or declarations between 1948 and 1964 as claimed. See: Summing up

Chapter 13. Camp Westerbork. 12 annotations are again all to pre-existing literature (published sources) Schnabel, Lee, Van Wijk/ De Bruyn etcetera. The first chapter on deportation-camp Westerbork.

Chapter 14. The Return 18 annotations, yet again all to pre-existing literature (published sources).

Chapter 15. The Collaborators 9 annotations, all to pre-existing literature (published sources).

Chapter 16. They Aren’t Coming Back. 16 annotations, all to pre-existing literature (published sources). Chapter rushes through Otto’s post-war life, including the news of the loss of his daughters, his remarriage to Elfriede Markovits, his relationships with the different helpers, and the aftermath of the Holocaust in western society.

Chapter 16 ends the first part of the book. Everything from the Frank family’s arrival in the Netherlands to the founding of the Anne Frank Foundation and Fonds, including on the company, the helpers, the hiders, the hiding, the raid, post-war investigations and justice, is drawn from other books, articles and existing historical research. Only 4 annotations pertain to own material or even archival finds. One of these sources is falsely attributed. It is only at page 97 that the actual investigation starts.

Part Two

Chapter 17. The Investigation No annotations. Vince Pankoke first comes to Amsterdam in April 2017. A meeting is set up with Xomnia, an Amsterdam based data company to furnish the team with an electronic inventory / artificial intelligence structure. ‘When Vince sat down with the scientists from Xomnia, they suggested that because the team was working on such an old case with
missing data, the puzzle of the August 4, 1944 arrest would almost certainly never be complete. Yet at some point the program’s algorithms should be able to predict what or who was the likely suspect’. (page 102)

Vince finds out that Dutch wartime files are, inconveniently, in Dutch, and that there are restrictions to access of Exceptional Justice files. The latter would pose a problem, but A.I. offered a solution to the former:

‘In addition to documents and book scans, the speech recognition portion of the Microsoft AI program was able to convert video and audio recordings to text, make them searchable, and translate them into English’

Did the program also convert the abundance of handwritten material and make it searchable? And machine translation and interpretation of such complicated material? In the end though, A.I. had no bearing whatsoever on the outcome.

Chapter 18. The Documents Men. 1 annotation, only partially relevant, a link to a newspaper article on the NARA archives. Why were there no inventory numbers provided to the NARA find of the ‘Kopgeld’ cache?

It might well be that Vince Pankoke didn’t exactly happen upon the cache by dexterous browsing in the American archives, but this is the same collection that David Barnouw pursued for a short while:

In 1964, while in Vienna during his investigation, Arend Van Helden had learned of files recently sent from the United States to the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, of Nazi administration, which, among other things, contained particulars on ‘premiums paid for the arrest of Jews’ in the Netherlands. But why did the CCT not mention that Van Helden had been looking for this particular collection? That alone would have made it pertinent to the investigation. It seems to have the same contents and pertains to the same time frame. This mysterious file, formerly an envelope of receipts that belongs with a registry, with the inventory number 173-c-10-14/84, however, could not be located at the time, and according to David Barnouw, it turned up neither in Germany nor the United States in 2002. The register itself is in the NIOD, along with copies of a handful of receipts that probably come from the envelope. Although it has no bearing on the Anne Frank case, this collection floats through the whole book like a detached mirage, and it would be interesting to learn, finally, what is in it. It seems to have become something of an amulet to the Cold Case Team and after all this, it’s hardly overly suspicious to wonder why.
Chapter 19. The Other Bookcase. No annotations. Another chapter to emphasise the enormous number of documents perused by the CCT.

Chapter 20. The First Betrayal. 9 annotations. 8 archival, 1 original interview. An interesting chapter on the rather overlooked suspect Joseph’s ‘Job’ Jansen. Details about Jansen at the end of the war are presented as CCT finds ‘a deep dive into Jansen’s file reveals...’, but the annotation does not even give Jansen’s CABR file number, let alone the applicable documents. Now all these details also feature in Sytze Van der Zee’s 2010 book *Vogelvrij - de jacht op de Joodse onderduiker*. As covered in: *What Miep Said* and *Summing Up*.

Chapter 21. The Blackmailer. On Tony Ahlers. 19 annotations, 5 to pre-existing literature, 9 archive, 2 scientific. Erroneous claim, copied from Lee and subsequently Barnouw, that Opekta ‘order books’ show the supply of pectin, pepper and nutmeg to the Wehrmacht. However there are no Opekta (or Pectacon) order books in existence. This assertion is one of the many in the book that are copied from Otto Frank’s biography by Carol Ann Lee without establishing their accuracy. David Barnouw also calls the transaction book of broker Jinnelt an ‘Opekta order book’. But that reveals no pectin, nor pepper nor nutmeg sold to, or by Opekta or Pectacon involving Wehrmacht or subsidiaries, but a sale involving another company, Oldenboom.

Chapter 22. The Neighbourhood. 3 annotations, 1 original (Xomnia collaborator map that appears to be based mostly on an pre-existing map by the Amsterdam City Archives), 1 pre-existing literature.

Chapter 23. The Nanny. 3 annotations, 1 article on the CCT, 2 archival, 1 error with US dating, turning 3-08-1944 into the 8th of March 1944, while of course it is the 3rd of August 1944. The CCT focus of the arrest of the mother of spontaneous informer ‘Jansje Theunissen’- But they ignore a much more pertinent arrest and other occurrences on the same night, from the same police registry, much closer to the Annex, namely right across the canal. Covered in: *Possibilities not Pursued*.

Chapter 24. Another Theory. 4 annotations, 1 to speech at book presentation of another book into the betrayal, with the father of the author as another
supposed -and improbable- additional helper from the area, this time with well-known, prolific Jewish snitch Ans Van Dijk as the betrayer.

**Chapter 25. The Jew Hunters.** 4 annotations, 2 pre-existing literature, 2 archive. First mention of declaration by Jew-hunter Eddy Moesbergen with the claim that Moesbergen stated that he had tried to warn Van den Bergh of a possible arrest after the loss of his Calmeyer status. This to serve as an example of Van den Bergh’s ‘Nazi contacts’. It is a *false* rendition of Moesbergen’s declaration⁹⁵:

As covered in *The Moesbergen Statement and Summing up*

**Chapter 26. The V-frau** 12 annotations. 5 pre-existing literature, 4 archival documents covering 6 annotations, 1 interview. Yet another chapter on Ans Van Dijk, against mostly an arrangement of previous publications, but still managing to contradict Sullivan’s own chapter 24.

**Chapter 27. No Substantial Proof Part 1**

9 annotations, all archival, including CABR. Only here, from page 164 of the book is where things actually get cracking as regards to the CCT own investigation. And this is where it promptly starts to spin out of control too. Deeply problematic chapter containing a curious view on post-war policing by Vince Pankoke (the notion that PRA investigations were subpar because of understaffing, due to all the collaborators having been fired from the police force is not a vouch for understanding of the material).

*False* claim of statement from policemen present at the raid as having been summoned by Kaper, nowhere to be found in the 1948 documentation. That would have gravely damaged their appeals. Gringhuis only admitted having worked under Kaper during the 1963/64 investigation: he was a free man by then. Nothing short of *fraudulent* is the claim to the notation in Otto’s agenda as pertaining to a visit to detained policeman Gringhuis to question him about the note⁹⁶, As covered in: *The Note and the Timing of the Note and Summing up*

**Chapter 28. Just Go to Your Jews!** 25 annotations, 5 of which are the translation of the biography of helper Bep Voskuijl by her son Joop van Wijk. Referring to interviews with or statements by Joop Van Wijk: 6 annotations. None of these statements are accredited by Van Wijk, three are pertinently incorrect⁹⁷.

Information provided by Van Wijk / De Bruyn is appropriated as CCT-
“discovery”, such as the passport application for Nelly Voskuijl which is both in the original Dutch edition of Van Wijk’s own book, as easily retrievable online at the Amsterdam City Archives\(^98\). Joop Van Wijk went out of his way to accommodate the CCT with information, beyond his own ideas on the raid, and, like many others who did, his thanks were appropriation, distortion of the information he provided as well as slanderous ad-hominems in the book. As covered in: *Distortion and Appropriation*

**Chapter 29. Probing Memory**  8 annotations. 5 to pre-existing literature (published sources) of which 1 historical review, 2 archival, 1 private. Discrepancies in the accounts of the raid given at different times by Victor Kugler lead to the question whether Silberbauer and his crew had known there were Jews in the building. This because they could hardly totally ignore the 2016 theory of Dr. Gertjan Broek of the Anne Frank Stichting (Knowledge Centre of the Anne Frank House) that the raid could well have been the result of an investigation into distribution irregularities instead of betrayal\(^99\). A trip to Marbach am Neckar, described as arduous\(^100\), to view Ernst Schnabel’s notes and manuscript, makes the theory probe seem meticulous, but clears nothing up. As covered in: *Possibilities not Pursued* and *Summing up*

**Chapter 30. “The Man Who Arrested the Frank Family”** 20 annotations, 16 are to pre-existing literature, 4 archival. Chapter on Silberbauer. A return to the question ‘*Why did Otto lie to Wiesenthal about Silberbauer’s name*’. The question does not get answered. Where it might have been, by Miep Gies at the Wallenberg awards - see the next chapter- it is deliberately misinterpreted to fit the CCT’s aims. The chapter reveals nothing new as, again, mainly previously published sources were used. As covered in: *Luxury Hotels and Difficult Questions* and *What did Miep Say?*

**Chapter 31 What Miep Knew.**  
6 annotations, 1 YouTube and 5 pre-existing sources. Vince Pankoke has an aha-erlebnis listening to a Q&A with Miep Gies and NYU Modern History- professor Rolf Wolfswinkel at the Wallenberg Award at Michigan University in 1994. Pankoke becomes convinced that Miep’s answer to a question on the betrayal was a ‘slip-up’ and she was involuntarily identifying the betrayer as Van den
Bergh. This way, Miep’s answers can later be construed as to ‘fitting only’ Van den Bergh. Followed by a suggestive citation of a psychological article on keeping secrets. Finished by an ungracious and ignorant ‘musing’ by Vincent Pankoke on Wolfsinkel’s background in relation to his friendship to Miep Gies as thanks for the time he spent answering the CCT’s questions, akin to the treatment of other sources. As covered in: What did Miep say?

Chapter 32. No Substantial Proof II.
10 annotations, of which the first 4 refer to Van Helden, 3 to the 1948 investigation, 3 to pre-existing material and 1 original, namely the interview by Pankoke of Melissa Müller, Anne Frank biographer. Sequel to the hazardous Chapter 27 and only slightly less problematic. Manipulative comment about the CCT ‘finding no record of Martinus Van Maaren being wanted for failing to report to the Arbeitseinsatz’ where there wouldn’t be one. At that point any youngish man that could not produce written indispensability in Holland could be arrested and deported for labour. And were so, progressively in completely random raids and razzias. And that is why tens of thousands of young Dutch men, including Van Maaren’s son, were in hiding.

Chapter 33. The Greengrocer
30 annotations, 9 pre-existing literature, 16 archive including 1 none-CABR, not in the public domain, 5 original/ interview. The CCT distort the contents of the memoir (kept in private domain at the Anne Frank House) by ‘the greengrocer of the Franks’ Hendrik Van Hoeve, by way of a fictitious second meeting between Van Hoeve and Meiler, in Oranienburg, where there only was one mentioned in the actual memoir. They omit Meiler’s dysentery. The CCT theory suggests Meiler was in the Vught revier under this or another assumed name, proof of which is not given. Annotation 11 says: “Inventory number/obtained during call, Dutch Red Cross Archive”. It is unclear what that means and again, no inventory. See: Distortion and Appropriation and Summing up

Chapter 34 The Jewish Council
8 annotations, all pre-existing (pre-published) sources. Extensively and effectively covered in the Historians’ Refutation.

Chapter 35. A Second Look
Little thought is given to the phrasing of the note, such as the addition ‘by the Vondelpark’ to the address, which has a jealous flavour to it, while ‘A. van den Bergh’ is not credited with the title notary, as one might expect. The CCT obscure that Van Helden’s notation says that the original note was also typed. And then there is the matter of ‘de Jüdische Auswanderung’ and ‘J.A.’ See: The Note and the Timing of the Note, The Nemesis and Summing up

Chapter 36. The Dutch Notary
18 annotations, 2 pre-published sources, 14 archival, 2 original
This chapter and the two following chapters, concerning Van den Bergh’s Calmeyer status and its loss, mainly leans on the CCT assumption that one needed friends in high places and money to be able to have expectations of a Calmeyer status. This presumption has been extensively covered by the historians’ Refutation of March 22nd. The hiatus in Sullivan’s descriptions of the case Van den Bergh vs Schepers, and Schepers as a provably disturbed person, are so large it can be considered a major obscuration. Another important omission is that Schepers fought his case well into the fifties. The false claim about Moesbergen having stated he wanted to warn Van den Bergh is repeated. As covered in: The Nemesis and Summing Up.

Chapter 37. Experts at Work
3 annotations, 2 original, 1 Anne’s diary.
Describes the find of Otto Frank’s copy of the original note in a box at Van Helden’s son, and the process of verifying the authenticity, that is, the originality of the copy. As covered in: The Note and the Timing of the Note

Chapter 38. A Note Between Friends
7 annotations, 2 pre-published sources, 3 archival, which should be 3 published sources, 2 archival and 2 original, fraudulently reproduced.
The first sentence of the portion of the letter by Johannes Kleiman to Otto Frank of the 31st of March 1958, on page 247 has been changed/reversed from the Dutch. The original shows without question, to any Dutch reader, that Johannes Kleiman received the note by post, and read it to Van Hasselt, not the other way round. On the next page, a repeat of the fable, most probably stemming from
misattribution by biographer Carol Ann Lee that Otto Frank went to HVBII prison to visit Gringhuis, with surely one of the most curious annotations ever seen in non-fiction: one containing a triple lie to cover up for the fact they had not a clue what the base of this purported story is. Topped off by speculation on the exclusion of Kugler and Kleiman, based on an erroneous assumption that a German proposition was a name in the agenda, again. This is definitely one of the worst chapters in the book, literally everything is source pollution and it’s the chapter that is supposed to build the case. See: The Note and the Timing of the Note, the Nemesis and Summing up

Chapter 39. The Typist
6 annotations, 1 original. The CCT turns its attention to the possible authorship of the anonymous note. The most probable author of the anonymous note was Van den Bergh’s adversary J. Anton Schepers. But he was certified insane, so that would render the note worthless. As worthless as it was considered twice in the past (by none less than professor Lou de Jong, patriarch of Dutch WW2 history, and Detective Arend Van Helden.) An unwelcome remark by linguist Fleur Van der Houwen which fitted rather spot-on with Schepers, is a good reason for the CCT not to seek further professional analyses of the note. So, the team contrives some extremely thin reasons to rid themselves of Schepers as the author of the note (mostly based on the false timing of the that the note as sent in 1945, and even then incorrect) and they ignore the similarities between the note and the many letters Schepers wrote about Van den Bergh over more than a decade. Once Schepers is dispersed of, Thea Hoogensteijn is brought into the equation, with a pointless description based on pre-published sources. Hoogensteijn was a secretary of Willy Lages. She was convicted of collaboration, but was later found to have, possibly, saved some lives. A family member wrote a book about her. However, they conclude that it was unlikely that the note came from Hoogensteijn herself-she was gone by august 1944- but that it must have been sent by someone like her; a good heart in the core of the Euterpestreet headquarters. They leave the authorship of the note at that, as if it hardly matters who wrote it. See: The Nemesis and Summing up.

Chapter 40. The Granddaughter
6 annotations, 4 original, 2 archival.
The 4 original annotations are interviews that members of the Cold Case Team, and detective Brendan Rook held with Van den Bergh’s granddaughter. Only the two interviews with the granddaughter in 2018 are relayed and annotated in this chapter. Further interviews in 2019, when the granddaughter provided much more information she had gathered since the first, are left unmentioned. The first interviews are distorted, the later information omitted. Dates are mixed up. Contrary to the claims here and the later chapter 42 ‘A Bombshell’, where Sullivan states outright that the granddaughter had no knowledge of her grandparents hiding, with an annotation to the February 2019 interview with Pankoke and Rook, the granddaughter did tell them they were hiding in the village of Laren. As covered in: Possibilities not Pursued, The Nemesis and Summing Up

Chapter 41. The Goudstikker Affair. 12 annotations, 3 5 pre-existing (pre-published) sources, including Anne Frank’s diary, 8 archival, 2 original (interviews with granddaughter)
Sullivan writes of van den Bergh: “Van den Bergh was a clever man (...) Through his relationship with Miedl he enjoyed the (indirect) protection of Ferdinand aus der Fünten and Willy Lages. But even though he had connections at the highest levels of the Nazi world, Van den Bergh was not naive enough to trust a Nazi”. (page 263) Sullivan ignored or was not aware of the existence of the declarations of Ferdinand aus der Fünten as well as Lages, that they had never met nor heard of Arnold Van den Bergh. Aus der Fünten also states he has never heard of lists of hiding addresses of Jews at the Zentralstelle provided by Jews or the Jewish Council. If it were true that these lists contained ‘five hundred to a thousand’ cases (as in the Henn declaration the CCT considers valid) it would be impossible that he didn’t know of their existence. Both these statements are in the most central of dossiers in this whole case, the Van Helden files, so impossible to overlook. As covered in: The Nemesis

Chapter 42. A Bombshell 16 annotations, 7 pre-existing (pre-published) 6 archival, 3 original, 2 hearsay spanning more than 60 years, presented as fact. This chapter has been covered well by Bart Van der Boom and Laurien Vastenhout in Chapter 5 of the Refutation. They defuse the quite absurd ‘Henn declaration’ of unsubstantiated and un-investigated hearsay that the CCT base
their existence of the ‘lists of hiding addresses on’ central to the chapter. The CCT fails to investigate who the alleged participants in the conversation even were. But the chapter contains much more hearsay, and hearsay in incorrect rendition at that. Sullivan relays that Otto Frank once said to Friso Endt, former head of the Parool newspaper, that they had been betrayed by Jews, plural, as Friso Endt supposedly told journalist Sytze Van der Zee, in 2010 (not the sixties, as Sullivan writes)\(^\text{109}\). Context, time and provenance are lacking. But for all we know, by ‘we’ he might have meant the Jewish community as a whole, and by ‘Jews’ the Jewish Council in its totality and all its actions, which would make it a reasonably commonplace post-war statement. Not just the so-called ‘bombshell’ itself (see Refutation), the whole chapter is a veritable explosion of nonsense.

Shocking are the clearly deliberate manipulations of the so-called Schoenmaker file (Procesverbaal 414, Bureau Oorlogsmisdrijven, Assen) and of the Defence document of the Contact-Afdeling (aka Contact Commission), from which the team have cherry-picked and distorted elements to suit their theory, disregarding everything else that opposes it.\(^\text{110}\). When one reads the documents alongside each other, the real context to the claim of ‘incarcerated in Westerbork contacting relatives in hiding through letters couriered by the Contact Afdeling’, mentioned by the CA\(^\text{111}\), become clear. These instances all pertain to one situation: Where a non-Jewish relative, for instance a partner of a Westerbork inmate on penal status in a mixed marriage, remained at home. At some point commander Gemmeker had the idea of a deal, where if Jews in hiding came forward to join relatives already in Westerbork, and relinquished their assets, they would be held back from deportation, while if they were caught later on, they would be the the first on the next train. The plan was that this deal would be put to the non-Jewish relative, not in hiding, to relay to the Jewish relatives - if he or she knew their whereabouts. Some negotiations took place, but nothing much came of the plan. So this was no instance of direct contact with Jews in hiding from Westerbork.\(^\text{112}\)

From Max de Jong’s riposte to the Contact Commission, we learn that there was no need for the CC / Jewish Council to carry any other letters out of Westerbork at all: the actual little post-office Westerbork had, was run by (union) resistance members within the PTT: namely, Max de Jong himself, Maarten Talen and Assen postmaster Hendrik Lameris\(^\text{113}\), described as ‘our Lameris’. Lameris’ funeral
oration in het Nieuwsblad van het Noorden confirms this\textsuperscript{114}. Also, the letters Richard Weisz wrote from Westerbork to Riek Van Hoeve, of which the CCT makes much in relation to their switch of barrack, are stamped with regular postal stamps from the post office Assen.

The lie that Van den Bergh’s granddaughter had no knowledge of her grandparents hiding is repeated to top it all off. As covered in: \textit{Appropriation and Distortion, Summing up}

\textbf{Chapter 43. A Secret Well Kept} 6 annotations, 4 pre-existing (pre-published) sources, 2 archival. Sullivan writes about the central anonymous note:

\textit{“If the letter had arrived ten years later – say in the mid-1950s- it could be argued that someone was just trying to use Otto’s fame to cast a negative light on Van den Bergh. But at the time the note was received in 1945, the diary was not yet published and Otto Frank was just one of the 5,500 Jews returning to the Netherlands”} (page 276).

Only it wasn’t. That is why the CCT had to apply such a tour de force of malversations to validate it. This final chapter repeats all the major distortions, corruptions, falsifications and misinterpretations to that avail all over again and adds some new ones for good measure. Truly appalling is Sullivan’s karmic musing on Van den Bergh’s throat cancer and losing the ability to speak.

See: \textit{Summing up}.

\textbf{Epilogue The Shadow City} 16 annotations, all pre-existing (pre-published) sources. Sullivan writes that Otto Frank died of ‘lung cancer’. But Otto suffered from gastrointestinal cancer. A totally different type of cancer with other causes. Studies have shown a significant link between nutritional deprivation and gastrointestinal cancers, and a heightened incidence in concentration camp survivors\textsuperscript{115}. Book ends with a vague and rather maudlin description of post-war Amsterdam.
Conclusion

The presented outcome of the Cold Case Investigation on the Betrayal of Anne Frank, through the book ‘The Betrayal of Anne Frank’ by Rosemary Sullivan, published by HarperCollins, is based on distortion of sources and fabulations.

The scope of the scam.
Did the investigation start out as the scam? - I now dare call it a scam after six months of research into the claims and annotations.
Possibly, but perhaps not. Maybe the basis of it all was simply ambition with not a small amount of hubris. At the start of the project, a project for which large amounts of money in book advances, donations and subsidies were sought, and received the question was posed: ‘What happens if there is no outcome, if you don’t find anything?’ That question can now be answered: No outcome was apparently not an option, despite all the reassurances given of ‘integrity above all’ during the investigation.

Losing face, and admitting that there were simply no new insights to be found, just an awful lot more maybe’s that are quite impossible to prove, as there is simply not enough documentation apart from already endlessly grazed files, was apparently not an option. Neither was using the acquired research for a truthful but obviously less sensational documentary or book.
Instead, a choice was made to pick a scenario, and that scenario was furnished with contrived evidence and use of questionable sources, while a lot of evidence to the contrary was deliberately obscured. There is hardly an ‘error’ that does not serve the end theory, and many incorrect claims cannot be errors. They are clearly purposeful manipulations of the material, where there is no mistake or misinterpretation possible.
Fraud does not always start of as fraud, but might start with absolute belief in the fraudsters’ own abilities to deliver in a normal or even exceptional way. Fraud might be an option born in desperation when that cannot be achieved. Of course it takes an exceptional lack of moral fibre and huge audacity to commit a scam of such a scale, on a subject like this, under the pretence of bringing ‘justice for all Holocaust victims’. So hard is it to believe anyone would do such a thing, that it’s done the CCT a service.

Several accusations against Van den Bergh are adopted from wartime and post-wartime conspiracy theories by the insane Schepers from a file the CCT had refrained from annotating. That is too deliberate to ignore, but it is more. There
is also more than a little of Scheper’s persona, his shadow as it were, present to
doing so.

A shocking, yet manageable scenario was a profitable scenario. A Jewish
betraying, one fitting a classical stereotype: Rich, connected, clever, was deemed
the most profitable choice. A classic story, of the kind that René Girard\textsuperscript{116} in his
philosophy on scapegoating called ‘mimesis’ ensued: A right Passion-play around
a secular saint Anne, where the suffering of the saint is enhanced by a betrayal
that comes complete with a Judas and his silver coins, Pontius-like washings of
hands and even threefold crowings. That included dangerous reflections such as:
“The Cold Case Team knew that Van den Bergh and his wife were never
deported, were never listed as being in any concentration camp, and
survived the war. What did Van den Bergh do to secure their survival? “
(page 263)

Which makes suspects of all Holocaust survivors.

By now, the CCT and the author may have convinced themselves to such an
extent that their theory is correct, that they honestly believe that it doesn’t
matter they tampered with the evidence: such appears to be the strength of
mimesis on the subconscious; from Scheper to Sullivan, it makes stereotyping
and scapegoating into logic, into common sense. Not all antisemitism is hatred
of Jews or incitement of violence against Jews. Often it’s simply falling for
cliches, and sometimes those cliches are profitable where they are easily
accepted on a large scale as truth. Particularly where scapegoating covers up
possibilities less broadly palatable; transgressions by others, for instance.
The lack of effort by the CCT to really look into the possible culpability in the raid
of the war-time Recherche-centrale that Gringhuis worked for, eclipsing not only
this RC’s involvement with Prinsengracht 263, but the RC’s very existence, is
noticeable. With it the far-reaching collaboration of the Dutch police force at the
time with the occupier, well beyond the odd policemen detached to the SD, is
erased from the investigation. That is not something one would expect of a
neutral Cold Case Team. That there was a certain amount of liaison in this
investigation with current representatives of the Dutch police is most probably
utterly coincidental, but becomes more pertinent to question in the turn-out of
events.

Instead of answering real prevailing questions, the chosen scenario offered
pseudo-reflection of a spiritual, self-searching nature to readers: The accusation
was endlessly shrouded in ‘what would you do if it was about saving your own
family’ kind of ‘understanding’ for the accused that served to save the team and author from being called callous or bigoted. The end product was worsened by consecutive choices of the surrounding structure: For a Canadian writer unfamiliar with the Dutch language and unable or unwilling to distil a coherent story from the accumulated data or check quotes and claims is a far cry from ‘starting afresh’. To criticism, the author responded with hard-bitten, aggressive and progressively untruthful retorts in interviews. Translators into Dutch from the English text failed to check original Dutch texts and therefore missed the manipulations performed on the documentation by the Dutch team members, that could have saved their publisher a lot of money and loss of face.

Media
Both the Dutch and the international media, on the whole eagerly accepted the presented scoop, especially since it was presented with a thin and false wrapping paper of accreditation by specialists in the field. Major news outlets, in the Netherlands and beyond, foremost CBS ’60 minutes’ and the Dutch NOS with a long unveiling programme, failed miserably to scrutinise even the basis of findings before blasting Van den Bergh’s name into the world as the betrayer. Both still viewable online today, while containing many untruths already uncovered.

I urge the reader to watch the 60 minutes after reading this report and consider if this matches their standards of expectation from the series. Written media that carried the CCT presentation with blaring headlines, have continued to fail in their unwillingness to examine the findings until today. We have seen a few meta-journalistic efforts that only deal with the hype, and soul-searching about how they should have been more careful but hardly anyone in fixed media employment has bothered to look further into the documentation itself, even after 6 historians proved the central findings of the investigation so problematic two months after the presentation of the book.

I am astounded that I, as an independent, had to spend six months of mostly pro-bono work to bring these malversations to attention, despite the evidence that isn't even that hard to deliver. To me it’s a sign of progressive societal rot, a worsening of the kind of societal rot that Hendrik Van Hoeve already riled against in the fifties and seventies of the previous century. This is what makes people cynical and sceptical of ‘main stream media’ and indeed Holocaust history, and that is a huge danger in itself.

The rebuttals
The content of Vincent Pankoke’s rebuttals on the coldcasediary site is so ignorant that even slightly informed readers shudder with embarrassment at the
inanity of it all. But then, these rebuttals are not written for even slightly informed readers but are meant as damage control. Mist and smoke for the commercial public in the Anglophone world, mainly the US. For the readers taken in by the pseudo-reflection works and who now welcome Pankoke to enjoy his role as the hero that solved the Anne Frank case in schools, community centres and even synagogues.

On the 22nd of February 2022, Pankoke wrote a particularly petulant defence against the first round of criticism, and my article in de Groene Amsterdammer, where he failed to address the most central accusation I made, that they misrepresented the contents of Otto’s agenda:

“I was prepared for some pushback on a new theory being presented by outsiders to the subject matter, but nothing like we have experienced. I recall reading of only some slightly negative feedback received by an author that found undiscovered information and offered a new theory. Over the years, there have been many authors and historians that weighed in with their version of what caused the raid, naming suspects such as W. Van Maaren, Lena Hartog, Tony Ahlers, Nelly Voskuil, Ans Van Dijk, and Opekta/Gies & Co. salesmen Brouwer and Daatzelaar. Although there was an occasional critic expressing skepticism regarding some of their theories, none ever received the venomous attack that our theory has received.

I want to be sure to set the record straight that I admire and respect all of the authors and historians who were brave enough to venture an attempt to solve the mystery of what caused the raid.

One must ask, why have none of the other theories received the vitriolic response that ours did? Was it because ours identified someone Jewish, despite us describing him as a victim? What about the theory in a book released just a few years ago identifying Ans Van Dijk as the betrayer? She was Jewish. I don’t recall a full-out media attack on the author about his theory. For some reason, there seems to be a bit of a double standard when applying judgment in our case.

The most interesting thing to me as an investigator is the fact that not one of these previous theories (except the original Van Maaren theory) was ever originated by a witness (named or unnamed) identifying the betrayer. In other words, it was the author of these theories that first published the names and accused them of betrayal. Again, I ask, where was the outcry of dragging the accused suspects’ names through the mud by the originators of these theories? Yet more evidence of an extreme double standard.”

There is one important difference between the previous publications and Sullivan’s book in that there was a clear connection between the suspects, the
Annex and the Franks; such a connection is absent in the Van den Bergh case, except for the implication in the anonymous note.

Willem Van Maaren was the only suspect for decades. If anything, it was research by ‘authors and historians’ that slowly absolved him of the betrayal. Public discussion in those years, the late 1990s and early 2000s, when both Melissa Müller and Carol Ann Lee presented their theories, was rife. There was a lot of polemic about the books, the diary, the new ‘uncensored’ scientific editions, the pages in the possession of Cor Suijk. Papers and magazines were full of opinions that Vince Pankoke is simply oblivious to, as they appeared well before the growth of Internet, the onset of social media and remained mostly untranslated from Dutch. Yes, Melissa Müller was criticised for her implication of Lena Hartog, and she took some of it back. But accusing one cleaning lady has no implication to all, current-day cleaning ladies, apart from the possible perception as being classist. Accusing a Jew is another matter, as there are antisemites that will make individual Jews exemplary for all Jews, as we see happening now. Tonny Ahlers, accused by Carol Ann Lee, had claimed multiple times he was the betrayer himself, and, contrary to what Sullivan writes, his son certainly believed it, which makes it very different from the CCT accusation of Van den Bergh. Much more recently, in 2015, Nelly Voskuijl was implicated by her own nephew, Joop Van Wijk, in his biography of his mother, Bep Voskuijl. The inclusion of Nelly’s collaboration and a sublimated suspicion of her involvement in the arrest of the Franks, is described as a shadow on Bep’s later life. Vince Pankoke seems to have missed that the Anne Frank Stichting avidly opposed the suggestion of Nelly’s culpability, through press tidings at the time, with a zeal and force we have yet to see towards the CCT. That might be because the implication in Joop van Wijk’s biography, after all, touched upon the family of two of the helpers, as some might feel, tainted it, while notary Van den Bergh is further from the AFS area of interest. But the suggestion of Nelly was never presented as a definite, of a ‘solving of the mystery’; none of them were.

Ans Van Dijk was a prolific betrayer and was executed for it, and because of her close geographical proximity to the Annex, it was a logical step for journalists and historians to see if she had anything to do with the Frank case too. Her reputation could hardly be tarnished any further by those investigations. That she was Jewish is the only thing she had in common with Van den Bergh, yet Pankoke compares the two and calls the difference in indignance ‘a double standard’ which is slander in itself.

As for the Gies reps Brouwer and Daatzelaar, ‘dragging them through the mud’ is far from their mention as possible connection to an investigation in
distribution irregularities posed by the carefully worded theory by Gertjan Broek, senior historian of the AFS/ Anne Frank Knowledge Centre (and one of the multitude of historians whose name was annexed by the CCT in their quest for funding as a ‘consultant’) The theory itself got some press attention in 2016, but generally, in the media and the public sphere, the preference of a betrayal - because a preference is what it is - remains.

The names of these reps hardly ring a bell anywhere. The books that implicated Van Maaren, Lena Hartog and Tonny Ahlers didn’t centre on solving the betrayal case, they were biographies, twice of Anne Frank and once of Otto Frank. There was no pretence of law enforcement-type investigation on the basis of ‘new techniques’. No tricks in acquiring funding or subsidies were involved. There were mistakes, and misinterpretations, and doubtful elaborations, many of them adopted yet again by this Cold Case team, but there was no outright source pollution, where documents were provably purposefully misrepresented, as in this book. The Cold Case venture failed, they resorted to fraud, were criticised for their conclusions, but the backlash until now has hardly been vehement enough, as at this point of writing, they are still getting away with it, making money, and planning further exploitation of their distortions. As is Harper Collins, that ignored all signals to anything awry. As everyone told me, at some point or other, as if I didn’t know: “Anne Frank is big business”. Or, as a well-known Dutch historian was overheard to once say “the prize trophy”.

Anger

I have been warned by my dear supportive proof-readers not to sound ‘too angry’ in my writing. But, readers, I am angry. Anger fuelled my research. I’m angry that three arrogant men, utterly ignorant to complicated matters of War, Occupation and Holocaust, could barge into this sensitive subject and acquire massive funding, including public funding, with hardly a question asked. Proceed to contrive such an outrage and get away with it. All, as the very apt Dutch expression goes, by ‘trusting their blue eyes’. That they could abuse the nicest and most helpful people along the way in this whole story; the descendants of those described first and foremost. I am angry at the literary agent who turned the arrest of Anne Frank into an antique sale. At the behaviour of the lauded academic that moulded this aberration of an investigation into a book. At the cowardice of some of their researchers that must have known better than to accept this outcome as the truth, but who kept silent after they saw their work corrupted. At the international publisher abusing its power. A suspension of the book would also spark antisemitic backlash, a reason for organisations to be prudent. Which is also capitalised upon.
Finally
It does not diminish the importance of Anne Frank’s diary, her talent, her remembrance if the case of the Franks’ arrest is never solved. In that, she remains no different than most of the others, and in a way it makes her more representative of them. Many were betrayed, many more the victims of simple, ice-cold bureaucracy. Her death is one, if not just one, of the countless examples of what can come of stereotyping, of lies, of silent acceptance of wrongdoing, of deceit and of greed.
NOTES

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4 Rosemary Sullivan, Eden Mills Writers Festival zoom interview, February 23 2022, 19:25
5 Ibid, 46:25
6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRzWGcHR3Bg Het mysterie opgelost NOS January 17 2022
7 Idem Pieter van Twisk from 4:50 ‘kilometres of information, ten haystacks’. 
8 Petra van den Boomgaard, Voor de nazi’s geen Jood. Uitgeverij Verbum, Hilversum, 2019.
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10 29:36 min. 2022 Zoom-interview May 4, 2022, Hugh Mac Lennan McGill University
11 Procesverbaal Rijksrecherche no 86/1963 Van Helden page 18-19, November 3 1964
12 Algemeen Dagblad ea newspapers, December 7th 1957, retrieved through Delpher.
15 Otto’s agenda, december 6th, 1945, scan of original viewed at AFS, February 8 2022
16 Transcripts 1945 AFS, november 1 2007, OFA inv. nr. 2 MM rolnr. 2, opnamens. 130-194
18 Barnouw, pagina 34
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20 Telephone conversation with David Barnouw, July 28 2022
21 Barnouw, pagina 22
22 Letter from J. Kleiman to O. Frank 31st of March 1958, viewed courtesy AFS april 8 2022
23 NOS Journaal (evening news) January 17 2022 6:44 Peter van Twisk to Gerri Eickhof
25 Natasha Gerson , Groene Amsterdammer February 16, 2022,
26 Meta personal message to Vince Pankoke, April 10 2022.
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32 NA, JWA Schepers, CABR 22356 Declaration Anton Schepers, july 1945,
33 Ibid.
34 NA, Schepers, Police reports, July 7 and October 15, 1945.
35 NIOD 248-2247, Schepers, JWA, several letters March 1947
36 Refutation, B vd Boom and L. Vastenhout, the note, page 35 “ahistorical designation”
37 NA, JWA Schepers, CABR 22356 “Geen wanen doch er zijn zeker betrekkingsideeën” Psychiatric report, Tammenoms Bakker, S.P. 1947
38 NA, JWA Schepers, CABR 22356, WH Woortman, statement, Harlingen, 1st of July 1946
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42 Noord-Hollands Archief, Arr.rb Amsterdam, inv.nr. 489 Supervisory Board Chamber of Notaries, multiple correspondence
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44 NIOD 248-2247, JWA Schepers, statement van den Bergh, April 17, 1947
45 NA, JWA Schepers, CABR 22356, Lawyer de Kort 30th of June 1947.
46 Historiek, Cees van Hoore, March 5 2022
https://historiek.net/verkoop-goudstikker-wettelijk-gemaakt-door-van-den-bergh/147801/
47 NIOD, 248-2247 JWA Schepers, Parole request December 1947
48 Ibid, specifically letters, from April 17th 1947 to December 1947 including dec 9 1947 urging letters to ‘Mrs Henning, War Office, London’. As assessed from the Goudstikker minutes by a former notary conducting own research.
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51 Conversations with Rolf Wolfwinkel, May 12, 2022 and subsequent.
52 Ibid
53 Email Melissa Müller to Hella Rottenberg, February 7, 2022
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55 NA, Jansen, Josephus M, CABR 20834, Jansen, J.M, Proces verbaal PRA verklaring J Bremer
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57 Diverse krantenadvertenties, Delpher.
58 https://theaterencyclopedie.nl/wiki/Deutsches_Theater_in_den_Niederlanden
59 Systemcards PDL Herzogenbusch, (Vught) 386484, Meiler, M, June 12, 1893, retrieved via Arolsen Archives, reference code 0101202 oS
60 Memoir Hendrik van Hoeve, page 10, ‘there I saw Meijler again, arrested before I was’.
61 Verklaring Mauritz Frankenhuuis, page 58, Schoenmaker, Procesverbaal 414.
62 Visit to Westerbork, conversation with Guido Abuys, March 3, 2022
63 NIOD wbk-250i-0716 , page 10 and Aanvullingen S-gevallen.
64 Amsterdam Telephone Directory, 1938/1939
65 L-claim Richard Weisz, 1287/12461. JOKOS file 54058
66 NIOD, WBK-2-1-0716/ wb-250i-0716 Contact-Afdeling Defense, Fritz Grünberg et al, page 11-12
67 ‘Beantwoording van het exposé betreffende het werk van de Contactafdeeling te Westerbork’ Max de Jong, juli 1945. Wb-250i-0716
68 Richard Weisz Die Häftlinge des KZ-Außenlagers Hailfingen/Tailfingen, Mall/Roth, p 50
69 Ibid and assessment on account of official death date
70 The Breda Four ‘Vier van Breda’, were the four top Nazis responsible for the deportation of 104,000 Dutch Jews: Fischer, Aus der Fünten, Lages en Kotälla.
71 Nationaal Archief, CABR 107491, Statement J Asscher-Snijders, May 12, 1948
72 Twitter @MichielvdGalien, January 21, 2022
73 Joodsmonument.nl Online database of Dutch Holocaust victims
74 Stadsarchief Amsterdam https://archief.amsterdam/inventarissen/details/5225
75 Reply from David Cahn, Yad Vashem, correspondence nr CAS-381766, April 11, 2022
76 Confirmed by Joop van Wijk per email, April 5th 2022
77 Death certificate Johanna Mater-Burgers, gemeente Baarn, 2 mei 1945
78 meldingsrapporten Politie 1940-1945 Stadsarchief Amsterdam, 79 March 14, 1941, 26th April 1942, 19th May 1942, and April 21st 1945 meldingsrapporten Politie 1940-1945 f
79 Ernst Schnabel ‘Notizbuch’ DLA Marbach. Sent in pdf by Dorit Krusche 29th of July, 2022
80 An Investigative Report on the Betrayal and Arrest of the Inhabitants of the Secret Annex by Dr GJ. Broek, AFS/AFKC
Rebuttal, Vincent Pankoke, March 21, 2022 also mentioning Daatzelaar as suspect in rebuttal claiming ‘abundant evidence to the contrary’ – unproduced, in his rebuttal of February 22, 2022

Both in the press kit statement as Vincent Pankoke’s rebuttal of February 22, 2022 and in his rebuttal of February 22, 2022

Conversation with Stef and Tanjoes van Hoeve, June 17, 2022

Nationaal Archief, CABR, BRC 75395, Gringhuis, G, statement nov 7 1946

Both in the press kit statement as Vincent Pankoke’s rebuttal of February 22, 2022

Conversation with Stef and Tanjoes van Hoeve, June 17, 2022


Nationaal Archief, Henn, E.P., CABR 2.09.09, 107491 PV Sept 15, 1947

The CA-BS form of Pieter van Twisk sr. shown online is not a Systeemkaart by Bob Houwen and is no evidence of resistance participation, as they were not yet examined claims based on claimants own statements, while the Systeemkaarten were researched well into the 1980s. This form was not found in the physical archive; the appropriate Houwen box, but is part of another archive: 2220/374, as established in the presence of Albert Beuse of the Groninger Archieven on April 28th 2022. Why, when and where the decision was made to add this entry tot the online archive of the Systeemkaarten Verzetsbetrokkenen (as 4 of 4000) could not be established. The last addition/change to the online archive was made in august 2021.

‘Netherlands finance office provenance, consisting of expenses and disbursements to informants by personnel of various headquarters sections and of Aussenstelle Amsterdam engaged in gathering information, Mar. - May 1942 and May-July 1943” EAP 173-c-10-14/84 according to Henry Mayer, NARA, to NIOD, 15 oktober 2002. Note 266, Barnouw, 2003

NIOD 077.2.7.03.2.7 Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes/ Standige Vertreter/ Aussenstelle Amsterdam

The original source is unclear, but it appears to be another instance of citing Carol Ann Lee. Barnouw, page 9 of his report, speaks of Pectacons’ order book. GJ Broek (page 19 of his report) identifies the transaction as coming from a logbook of brokers MP Jinnelt & Co.

Karin Stevense https://karinstevense.blogspot.com/ entries between Feb 3rd 2022 and May 1st 2022

Moesbergen, NIOD 248-1163A, PRA 60678 August 1945

Otto’s agenda, december 6th, 1945, scan of original, viewed AFS, february 8 2022

Conversation with Joop van Wijk July, 28 2022

Paspootvaanragen ‘40-’45, archive 5181, inventory 7481 Hendrika Petronella Voskuil https://archief.amsterdam/indexen/deeds/3474a390-fca4-4897-bdc9-3589f7207575


Also see: https://jangielkens.blogspot.com/2022/02/ February 15, 2022 ‘Een excursie’.

Telephone conversation with Rolf Wolfswinkel, May 12, 2022.

Witness account Hendrik van Hoeve, page 10

Nationaal Archief, JWA Schepers, CABR 22356, 4990, Reclasseringsrapport January 28 1948, Dr G. Hoeneveld, 1937: “Chronische paranoia, ernstig psychopaat” Dr Tammenoms Bakker, 1947 ‘duidelijke oordeelszwakte grenzend aan betrekkingswaan, euforie zelfoverschatting, querulant’

Nationaal Archief, NBI 2.09.16.13 – PD11109 JWA Schepers, 1955 and inventory 4583

The only possible source is the Van Helen report 1964, page 18-19 This is the only place in all documentation where Gringhuis and the note feature on the same page.

Nationaal Archief, JWA Schepers, CABR 22356, 4990, Reclasseringsrapport January 28 1948

Conversations with Mirjam de Gorter, June-July 2022. JMWWUV-report Esther van den Bergh, February 21 1978, no. 539553 and Emma van den Bergh, 539554
Bio and contact

Natasha Gerson (1969) is an independent researcher, journalist, and translator as well as a long-time specialty cleaner in the healthcare and food industry. Her writing credits through the years include articles for major Dutch news outlets, novels, non-fiction, documentary and the screenplay of award-winning feature film Calimucho. She currently provides private and corporate research services on the subject of WW2, Occupation, Holocaust, forced labour, and claims. She volunteers in several digitalisation projects.

Her more recent (co-)translations into Dutch include Sarah Perry’s The Essex Serpent and Andrew Roberts’ biography Churchill, Walking with Destiny. She is a frequent contributor to Jonet, broad platform for the Dutch Jewish community. If you would like to contribute towards the time and travel for this factcheck, please do so through PayPal at ngerson@gmail.com or ask for other possibilities through the same email address. Your comments, questions, suggestions or research assignments are equally welcome there. You can also support my work through https://www.patreon.com/natashagerson.

Thank you.